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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Appellant Holli Telford ("Telford") brought claims against numerous defendants related

to her attempt to purchase property sold at a tax sale by Smith County, Texas. Those defendants
include Smith County, Texas ("Smith County"), Smith County Tax Assessor Gary Barber
("Barber"), attorney Tab Beall ("Beall"), and Beall' s employer, Perdue Brandon Fielder Collins
& Mott, LLP ("Perdue Brandon"). Though the claims against the other named defendants were

dismissed due to Telford's failure to properly serve the lawsuit, see R. Vol. I, pp. 122 - 24, Vol.

III, p. 426, all of Telford's claims against Smith County, Barber, Beall, and Perdue Brandon
(collectively referred to as "Respondents") were dismissed on the grounds that the District Court
had no personal jurisdiction against such persons and entities. R. Vol. II, p. 313 (Memorandum
Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment); R. Vol. III, pp. 422 - 24 (Memorandum
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration); R. Vol. III, pp. 425 - 26 (Judgment). District Court
Judge Dunn found that none of the Respondents had engaged in acts which subjected them to
jurisdiction under the Idaho Long Arm Statute, IC § 5-514. R. Vol. II, p. 309; Vol. III, p. 420.
Judge Dunn also concluded that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Respondents would
violate Constitutional due process. R. Vol. JI, p. 311; Vol. III, p. 422.
As Ms. Telford is a well known serial litigant2, she has identified eight issues which she

2

See http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0903/104.html (last checked Feb. 1, 2013). See also Los Angeles
Home-Owners Aid. Inc. v. Lundahl, CIV.05-126-E-BL-W, 2005 WL 1140649 (D. Idaho May 13, 2005) (Telford's
"filing history in other courts is a matter of public record and shows that she is a vexatious litigant."); Lundahl v.
Quinn, 2003 UT 11, 67 P.3d 1000, 1002 (UT, 2003) ("Where most ordinary individuals find themselves in court on
only a handful of occasions in their lives, Holli has managed to embroil herself in more litigation in just a few short
years than one would think humanly possible."); Lundahl v. Nar Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (D. Idaho 2006)
(identifying numerous states and jurisdictions in which Telford has been identified as a vexatious litigant); Lundahl
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 544 U.S. 997, 125 S. Ct. 1940, 161 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2005) (indicating that Telford has "repeatedly
abused [the Supreme] Court's process"); Lundahl v. Hawkins, CIV.A. SA09CV0588XR, 2009 WL 2461220 (W.D.
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seeks this Court to review. Addendum, pp. 32 - 46. However, with regard to Respondents, the
only issue on appeal is whether there is personal jurisdiction over them within the State of Idaho
(as this was the only grounds on which Judge Dunn dismissed the claims against Respondents).
Therefore, in an effort to save time and expenses (and duplication of resources and materials),
Respondents collectively submit this brief in response to Telford's Opening Brief. Where
argument regarding individual Respondents is necessary, such arguments will be addressed
specifically.

B.

Statement of the Facts
Telford attempted to submit a bid on property that had been struck-off in Smith County,

and therefore was subject to sale by sealed public bid. R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 24 (Complaint iii! 4 6). 3 The property at issue had been struck off as a judgment against the property had been
obtained by Tyler Independent School District. R. Vol. Supp., p. 93 (Beall Aff.,

if 23). Tyler

Independent School District was represented during that process by Beall and Perdue Brandon.
Id. The public bid sale was handled by Smith County. R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 24 (Complaint iii! 4 - 7).

Telford submitted the bid by providing a written, paper copy of the bid to the Smith County Tax
Assessor's office. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 123 - 24, 127 - 34 (Barber Aff.

iii! 12 - 14, Exs. A and B).

Nowhere in her sealed bid did Telford indicate that she was from Idaho, as her sealed bid listed
her address as a P.O. Box in Tyler, Texas, and her phone number had a 469 area code (which is
for Texas, not Idaho). R. Vol. Supp., pp. 123, 127 - 34 (Barber Aff.,

if 11, Exs. A and B).

Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (identifying states and jurisdictions in which Telford has been identified as a vexatious litigant,
and identifying that Telford had been found incompetent to stand trial).
Telford claims that she "accepted the offer" of Smith County to sell the property. However, this is an
incorrect statement oflaw. As Telford admits, she was bidding on property at a tax sale. R. Vol. I, p. 24 (Complaint,
if 4). As there may be multiple bidders, and as typically only one bid may be accepted, see 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation § 834, Telford's bid should be considered as the offer, and not an acceptance.
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Plaintiff never received a deed for the property. R. Vol. I, p. 24 (Complaint, if 7); R. Vol. Supp., p.
124 (Barber Aff.,

if 17).

Throughout the bidding process, Telford made a number of visits to Texas. 4 As far as
Respondents are able to determine, Telford visited Texas in February, 2011 5, April, 2011 6, and
May, 2011 7• Apparently the February visit was to obtain information about the property at issue.
R. Vol. I, p. 127

(if 6). Telford also had friends and/or relatives travel to Texas on her behalf in

March, 2011, to be present for the bid openings (which Telford alleges she \Von). R. Vol. I, pp.
128 (if 8), 134 - 35 (if 4). Telford alleges a number of telephonic communications between
herself and various employees of Smith County during April, 2011, presumably informing her
that hers was the only bid. Addendum, pp. 18 - 20. 8 Telford's visited Texas in April and May,
2011, to take possession of the property, despite the fact that no deed had been received. R. Vol.
I, pp. 128 (if 10), 141 -42 (if 12). When issues were discovered with the property Telford had bid

on (allegedly, the property had been misidentified in the bidding documents), Telford went in
person to the Smith County Tax Assessor's office to address those issues. R. Vol. I, p. 142

(iii! 13

-14).
On May 6, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Smith County Tax Assessor's office
withdrawing her original bid, and attempting to provide a substitute bid (in the form of a letter as
opposed to a sealed bid). R. Vol. Supp., p. 124 (Barber Aff.,

if 20). This document was delivered

4

Telford was not purchasing the property on her own behalf. She was purchasing it for another person,
Elham Neilsen, who was a resident of Utah. R. Vol. I, p. 126 (ifif 2, 3).
R. Vol. I, pp. 127 (if 5), 131 (if 3).
6

R. Vol. !,pp. 128(if10), 131(if2).

7

R. Vol. I, p. 25

A majority of these references are without citations to the record. Respondents contend that these
references should be disregarded. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790-91, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152-53 (2010).
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to the Smith County Tax Assessor's office by Ms. Telford's agent, L.A. Greer, who appears to
be a resident of Texas. R. Vol. I, p. 131; R. Vol. Supp., pp. 136-38 (Barber Aff., Ex. D). As this
letter was not a sealed bid, it could not be accepted. R. Vol. Supp., p. 124 (Barber Aff.,

if 21 ).

Though Telford was the only bidder on the property, her bids were never accepted by Smith
County, as they were never approved by the various applicable taxing districts (including Tyler
Independent School District, Smith County, and Emergency District No. 2). Id (Barber Aff.,

if

16). Despite the fact that Telford had never received a deed to the property, she went so far as to
place a mobile home on the property at issue, and do other work on the property. R. Vol. I, p. 144
(Telford Aff.

iii! 17-19). In early June, 2011, Telford was informed that the property had been

redeemed, and that she would not be receiving a deed to the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 26
(Complaint, if 11), 144 (Telford Aff., if 20). 9 This lawsuit followed.
Telford claims that she paid a deposit on the property for which she submitted a bid.
Addendum, p. 17.

10

This is incorrect. Telford never paid for the property at issue. R. Vol. Supp.,

p. 124 (Barber Aff.,

if 19). Telford cites to pp. 258 - 59 of the record to support her contention

that she paid a deposit. Addendum, p. 17. While it is not exactly clear what are the documents
cited by Telford, they do not show that money was transferred related to the property bid at
9

Telford alleges a great number of facts in her opening brief, all of which lack any citation to the record. See
Addendum, pp. 22 - 23, 25, 27. For example, Telford alleges that Perdue Brandon and Beall were responsible for
preparing a deed. Addendum, p. 25. Telford also alleges that defense counsel was somehow involved in a police
search of her home. Addendum, p. 27. As there is no citation to the record which would support these facts (nor is
defense counsel in any way aware of these facts, never having heard them before), it is requested that they be
disregarded. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790-91, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152-53 (2010).
10

Telford also claims that Lois Moseley, a Smith County employee, asked her to "pay a 1/3 cash deposit of
her bid price and to send these deposit funds in a cashiers check or wire the funds" to various parties. Addendum, p.
17. This is an incorrect assertion. Telford has not cited to the record to show that any such request ever occurred.
Indeed, Respondents are not aware that Telford has ever made this contention before. See R. Vol. I, pp. 22 - 36
(Complaint, with no mention of a request for a 113 deposit); 138 - 45 (Telford Aff. in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss,
with no mention of a request for a 1/3 deposit); R. Vol. II, pp. 264 - 282 (Telford's Objection to the Motion to
Dismiss, with no mention of a 1/3 deposit), etc. Indeed, Telford cannot show any factual source for this allegation.
The record clearly shows that Telford submitted a letter of credit with her bid, nothing more. R. Vol. Supp., p. 132
(Barber Aff., Ex. A).
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issue. Though Telford fails to mention it in her briefing, she had previously made bids on other
properties at tax sales, one of which was for a mobile home. R. Vol. I, p. 144 (Telford Aff.
18).

11 12
'

if

Telford stated that the mobile home she purchased was one "formerly belonging to

Clarence Williams." Id. The sale of that mobile home is not at issue in this lawsuit, as it was not
addressed in the Complaint. See R. Vol. I, pp. 22 - 36. However, when Telford alleges that the a
deposit was wired from her bank, she neglects to mention that that money wired was related to
the purchase of the mobile home, and not to the property at issue. See R. Vol. II, pp. 258 - 259
(referencing the "Clarence Williams transactions", at the bottom of p. 259). There is no evidence,
nor has Telford pointed to any in the record, that she made or any Respondent actually accepted
payment relating to the property at issue.
While the record shows that Telford had numerous trips to and contacts with entities and
persons in Texas, in contrast, none of the Respondents has any connection with Idaho. With
regard to Barber, the unrefuted facts show that during the time that Telford was taking these
actions, Barber was the Smith County Tax Assessor. R. Vol. Supp., p. 123 (Barber Aff.,

if 2).

Barber has never been within the boundaries of the State of Idaho. Id. (Barber Aff.,

if 4). He

owns no property in Idaho, nor has he ever owned property in Idaho. Id (Barber Aff.,

ifif 5 - 6).

He transacted no business in Idaho. Id. (Barber Aff.,

if 7). Any interaction Barber had with

Telford and her associates occurred in Texas. Regardless, Barber does not remember ever talking
to Plaintiff during the events she outlines in her Complaint. Id (Barber Aff.,

if 8). No personal

service of the Summons or Complaint was made upon Gary Barber. R. Vol. Supp., p. 119

11

This was the mobile home that eventually ended up on the property at issue.

12

Though the record on the tax sale for the mobile home is less clear (because it was not an issue in the
Complaint), that tax sale also took place entirely within the State of Texas. R. Vol. I, p. 144 (Telford Aff., ~~ 18 19).
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(Springerley Aff.,, 14).
The uncontroverted facts also show that Smith County has no connection with Idaho.
Smith County is a political subdivision and governmental entity located within the state of
Texas. R. Vol. Supp., p. 118 (Springerley Aff.,, 4). It does not own any property in Idaho, has no
registered agent in Idaho, does no business in Idaho, holds no licenses in Idaho, is not registered
with the state of Idaho in any way, produces no goods which are sent to Idaho, does not send its
employees or agents to Idaho for any reason which would benefit Smith County, and does not
consent to jurisdiction over it within the State of Idaho. Id., 118 - 19 (Springerley Aff., ,, 5 - 11,
15). Telford served Smith County and Gary Barber by sending a letter, certified mail, to Judge
Joel Baker, the County Judge. Id. p. 119 (Springerley Aff., ,, 12 - 13). No personal service of
the summons or Complaint was made upon Smith County, Texas. Id. (Springerley Aff.,, 14.)
The facts regarding Beall and Perdue Brandon are similar, and show how innately
ridiculous it was to include them in this suit. Beall has never represented Holli Telford as an
attorney, or provided her any services in any manner. R. Vol. Supp., p. 92 (Beall Aff., ,, 5 - 6).
Mr. Beall is not licensed in Idaho, has never been to Idaho, has never represented any clients in
Idaho, does no business in the state of Idaho, has never purchased goods, equipment, or property
from entities in Idaho, does not own nor has he ever owned property in Idaho, does not advertise
his services in Idaho, and produces nothing which could reasonably be expected to end up in
Idaho. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 92 - 93 (Beall Aff., ,, 9 - 16). When Mr. Beall spoke with Plaintiff
Holli Telford, he was not informed that she lived or was present in Idaho. Id. at 93 (Beall Aff.,,
22). Mr. Beall had practiced law at the Tyler, Texas office of Perdue, Brandon for twenty two
years. Id. at 92 (Beall Aff., , 2).
The same is true of Perdue Brandon. Perdue Brandon is a law firm located within the
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 6

boundaries of the state of Texas. R. Vol. Supp., p. 88 (Darlow Aff.,, 5). It provides legal services
for governmental agencies within the state of Texas. Id. Perdue Brandon does not do any
business in Idaho, is not registered to do business in Idaho, and no attorney at Perdue Brandon is
licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. Id. (Darlow Aff.,

ii, 6 -

7). Perdue Brandon does

not sell, lease, or otherwise create any goods, equipment, or property in Idaho, or that could end
up within the state of Idaho. Id. (Darlow Aff., ,, 8 - 9). Perdue Brandon does not own any
. Tclah
. not a reg1stere
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,, 9 - 13). Perdue Brandon does not advertise within the state of Idaho, nor does it seek to form
business contacts within Idaho, as its attorneys are not licensed there. Id. at 89 (Darlow Aff.,

ii

14). Perdue Brandon does not represent any clients within the State of Idaho. Id. (Darlow Aff.,

ii

15).
Beall and his employer, Perdue Brandon, represented the Tyler Independent School
District, and obtained a tax judgment against the property at issue. R. Vol. Supp., p. 93 (Beall
Aff., 23). Beall and Perdue Brandon had no connection with the tax sale of the property at issue,
and only spoke with Telford once, on or around June 2, 2011 (the day before Telford filed the
Complaint). R. Vol. I, p. 144 (, 20); R. Vol. Supp., p. 93 (Beall Aff., 22). According to Telford,
Beall informed Telford that the redemption of the property was appropriate (an opinion with
which she clearly disagrees). R. Vol. I, pp. 26 (Complaint, , 12), 144 (Telford Aff. , 20).
However, Mr. Beall did not represent the Smith County Tax Office, Gary Barber, Plaintiff Holli
Telford, or Smith County in any way with regard to the sale of the property. R. Vol. Supp., p. 92
- 93 (Beall Aff., ,, 5 and 25). It is Mr. Beall's understanding that the property at issue was
redeemed pursuant to Texas law in a timely manner. Id. at 93 (Beall Aff., , 24). Based purely on
this one conversation, Telford included Beall and Perdue Brandon as a party in this matter.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 7

On or around June 13, 2011, the Tyler, Texas office of Perdue, Brandon, received via
certified mail, a copy of a document entitled "Summons", with a copy of the Complaint. R. Vol.
Supp., p. 93 (Beall Aff.,

ir

Complaint. Id. (Beall Aff.,

20). Mr. Beall received no personal service of the summons and

ir

21 ). Mr. Beall is not authorized to accept service on behalf of

Perdue Brandon. Id., pp. 89, 93 (Darlow Aff.,

irir 16 -

19; Beall Aff.,

ir 19). The registered agent

for receiving service of process for Perdue Brandon was not personally served with a copy of the
Surrunons and Complaint, nor have they received a copy through the U.S. Mail system. Id., p. 89

(Darlow Aff., if 17 - 18).

C.

Procedural History 13
On June 3, 2011, Telford filed a Complaint in the Sixth Judicial District, Oneida County.

R. Vol. I, pp. 22 - 30. She named several defendants, including Respondents. Id., p. 22. The

Complaint alleged four specifically identified causes of action: specific performance, breach of
contract and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the "Idaho Consumers
Sales Practices Act" 14, and violation of the Utah Fraudulent Communication Act. R. Vol. I, pp.
27 - 29. Telford alleges that she served all of the defendants, including the Respondents, by
mail. 15 R. Vol. Supp., pp. 19 - 20, 34 - 35, 47 - 48, 56 - 57.
On June 30, 2011, Smith County and Barber filed a Notice of Special Appearance. R.
Vol. Supp., pp. 60 - 61. Beall and Perdue Brandon did likewise, on July 5, 2011. R. Vol. Supp.,

pp. 62 - 63. Around this same time, Telford requested default judgment against all of the various
13

This case had a large number of filings which are not particularly relevant to this appeal. In the Procedural
History, Respondents focus on those filings which specifically relate to Judge Dunn's rulings dismissing Telford's
claims.
14

Respondents were unable to find any act in Idaho called the "Consumers Sales Practices Act." It is
presumed that this act was meant to refer to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I. C. § 48-601, et seq.
15

See R. Vol. I, pp. 43 - 121 generally (motions for default judgment and affidavits of service for other
defendants besides Respondents).
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defendants. R. Vol. I, pp. 43 - 121; R. Vol. Supp., pp. 12 - 59. On July 13, 2011, Beall and
Perdue Brandon filed a Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Summary
Judgment, with supporting documents. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 64 - 96. That same day, Smith County
and Barber filed similar motions and supporting documents. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 97 - 138. These
motions sought dismissal on the ground that none of the Respondents had any connection with
the State of Idaho, and thus there was no personal jurisdiction over Respondents. R. Vol. Supp.,
pp. 75 - 80, 108 - 12. Respondents also argued other defenses, including improper service of
process and improper venue. Id., pp. 72 - 75, 104 - 08.
On July 18, 2011, Judge Dunn filed a Memorandum Decision denying Telford's petitions
for default judgment, on the grounds that Telford had improperly served all of the defendants, as
service was not allowed by mail. R. Vol. I, pp. 123 - 24.
On August 1, 2011, Telford filed numerous affidavits in response to the Respondents'
Motions to Dismiss. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 5 - 6 (Register of Actions). On August 18, 2011,
Beall/Perdue Brandon and Barber/Smith County each filed a Reply in support of the Motions to
Dismiss. R. Vol. I, pp. 153 - 61 (Beall/Perdue Brandon's Reply), 162 - 70 (Barber/Smith
County's Reply). After the Replies were filed, Telford filed a document purporting to be an
objection to the Motions to Dismiss. R. Vol. II, pp. 264 - 84. A hearing was held on the Motions
to Dismiss on September 7, 2011. R. Vol. Supp., p. 7.
On October 3, 2011, Judge Dunn issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting the
Respondents' Motions, and dismissed all claims against the Respondents. R. Vol. II, pp. 300 14. Judge Dunn concluded that there was no personal jurisdiction over the Respondents under
the Idaho Long Arm Statute, IC. § 5-514, and that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
Respondents would violate constitutional due process. R. Vol. II, pp. 305 - 11. Judge Dunn made
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- 9

no ruling as to Respondents' arguments that service of process and venue were improper. Id.
On October 18, 2011, Telford filed a Motion for Reconsideration. R. Vol. II, pp. 315 - 39.
Respondents filed a joint Response on November 14, 2011. R. Vol. II, pp. 359- 67. Telford filed
her Reply on November 21, 2011, R. Vol. III, pp. 392- 400, and a hearing was held on February
14, 2012. R. Vol. Supp., p. 8. Judge Dunn, ruling from the bench, denied Telford's Motion for
Reconsideration. R. Vol. III, p. 412. Judge Dunn later issued a written decision, on February 29,
2012. R. Vol. III, pp. 414 - 24. Judge Dunn determined that regardless of which prong of the
Idaho Long Arm Statute was addressed (whether contract, tort, or any other prong), the statute
still did not cover the Respondents. Id., pp. 417 - 20. Further, constitutional due process would
still be violated if the Court attempted to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Respondents. Id.,
pp. 420- 22. Judgment was entered on February 29, 2012. R. Vol. III, pp. 425 - 26.
Telford filed numerous post-judgment motions, all of which were denied. R. Vol. III, pp.
428 - 63. Telford did not file a written Motion to Amend the Complaint until several months
after judgment was entered. See R. Vol. Supp., p. 10; Vol. III, p. 458.

II.

RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Respondents restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did Judge Dunn correctly decide that there was no personal jurisdiction over
Respondents?

2.

Can the Supreme Court affirm Judge Dunn's dismissal of the claims against
Respondent's on other grounds?

3.

Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to IC §§
12-117, 12-120, 12-121,IR.C.P. 56,and!A.R. 40and41?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court granted summary judgment below. R. Vol. II, pp. 313. Summary
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judgment is proper
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing an
appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard
used by the district court originally ruling on the motion.

McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 490, 50 P.3d 983, 985 (2002) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). With regard to personal jurisdiction issues, this Court has stated
The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant is one of law, which this Court reviews freely. When reviewing a
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court applies the
same standard as ·when \Ve review appeals from orders of summary judgment; we
construe the evidence presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing
the order and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be
reasonably drawn.

Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 1026 (2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). As the party opposing the initial Motion to Dismiss and for Summary
Judgment, it is Telford's burden to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." IR.CF. 56(e). It is not the burden of the Court to "search the record on appeal for
error. Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in
compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived." Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149
Idaho 375, 383, 234 P.3d 699, 707 (2010). Further, arguments or assertions without citations
(either to the record or to authority) should be disregarded. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,
790-91, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152-53 (2010); Dawson, 149 Idaho at 382, 234 P.3d at 706. See also

IA.R. 35(a)(6) (briefs must be supported by citations to the record, authorities, and statutes).
IV.

ARGUMENT

Telford has listed eight specific issues on appeal. Addendum, pp. 3 - 4. However, with
regard to the Respondents, Judge Dunn only dismissed Telford's claims on the ground that there
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 11

was no personal jurisdiction. R. Vol. II, pp. 313; Vol. III, pp. 422 - 23. Therefore, these issues will
only be discussed to the extent that they relate to whether Judge Dunn's decision on personal
jurisdiction grounds should be affirmed. Respondents will also present alternate grounds for
affirming the judgment.

A.

JUDGE DUNN PROPERLY DETERMINED
JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS.

THAT

THERE

WAS

NO

Respondents contend that there is no basis for the Idaho Courts to exercise jurisdiction
over them. "In order for an Idaho court to exert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two
criteria must be met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of our
long-arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met." Saint Alphonsus

Reg'l Med Ctr. v. State of Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993). Judge Dunn
concluded that there was no basis to exert jurisdiction under either of the prongs of this test 16 ,
and Respondents contend that this was the proper result.
1.

Telford Caru10t Show that Respondents Acted in any \Vay which would Subiect
them to the Idaho Long Arm Statute.

The first step in determining whether there is personal jurisdiction over a defendant is
whether a defendant has acted in such a way that the long arm statute is implicated. Though it
seems an odd discussion, apparently the first thing that must be discussed is which statute is the
proper long arm jurisdiction statute within the State of Idaho. Telford contends that the long arm
statute is JC. § 48-613. Addendum, p. 32. This is incorrect. JC. § 48-613 deals only with service
of notice under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Instead, the proper long arm statute is JC. §
5-514. In cases discussing personal jurisdiction, they invariably refer to Idaho's long arm statute
as JC. § 5-514. See Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., Inc., 104 Idaho 210, 211-12, 657 P.2d
16

R. Vol. 11, pp. 309, 311 (Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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1078, 1079-80 (1983) (identifying IC § 5-514 as Idaho's long arm statute); Saint Alphonsus

Reg'/ Med Ctr. v. State of Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 743, 852 P.2d 491, 495 (1993) (same);
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 75, 803 P.2d 978, 981 (1990) (same). 17 That
being said, Respondents are unable to find that Telford ever referenced or discussed IC. § 5-514
in her opening brief. Because Telford has not made any argument regarding whether the Idaho
long arm statute provides jurisdiction over Respondents, Telford has waived such arguments.
"An appellant waives an issue if it is not supported by authority or argument on appeal."

Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 352, 233 P.3d 1221, 1274 (2010)
(Justice W. Jones, dissenting). See also Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 16, 175
P.3d 172, 178 (2007); Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303, 304, 939 P.2d 1382,
1383 (1997). Thus, to the extent that Telford argued that there is personal jurisdiction over the
Respondents under IC § 48-613, she has waived the argument that jurisdiction exists under IC

§ 5-514.
Even assuming that Telford had properly argued that jurisdiction under IC § 5-514, she
could still not show an act which would invoke that section. Under the Idaho long arm statute,
there are a number of acts which could subject a person to jurisdiction within the state of Idaho.

IC. § 5-514(a-f). Four of these provisions clearly do not apply, as there is no allegation of real
property within this state, contracting for insurance, maintaining a matrimonial domicile, or any
sexual acts. IC. § 5-514( c-f). Therefore, jurisdiction is proper over the Respondents only if
business was transacted or a tortious act was committed in Idaho. IC. § 5-514(a-b).
17

The list of cases citing J.C. § 5-514 as Idaho's long arm statute are numerous. See W. States Equip. Co. v.
Am. Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 157, 868 P.2d 483, 485 (1994); Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d
1024, 1026 (2005); lntermountain Bus. Forms. Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 540, 531 P.2d 1183,
1185 (1975); Purco Fleet Services. Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. o[Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 124, 90 P.3d 346, 349 (2004);
McAnally v. Bonjac. Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50 P.3d 983, 986 (2002); S. Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe &
Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 498, 567 P.2d 1246, 1249 (1977).
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With regard to Barber, Beall and Perdue Brandon, neither the business transaction or
tortious act provisions apply. Telford argues first that she formed a contract when she bid on the
property at issue. This is an incorrect statement of law. Telford submitted a bid on property being
sold at a tax sale. R. Vol. I, p. 139. A bid is an offer which may be accepted or rejected. See 72
Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 834. As any number of people could have bid on the

property at issue (and only one bidder could be accepted), the contract was not a unilateral
contract 18 and no contract was formed merely by Telford submitting a sealed bid. Regardless,
even if it were assumed that a contract was formed, it was for the sale of property which was
being sold at a tax sale. Thus, neither Barber, Beall, nor Perdue Brandon were the sellers, and
cannot be argued to have transacted any business at all, let alone within the State of Idaho. IC. §
5-514(a).
As to the commission of a tortious action within the state, Telford can point to no action
which occurred at all for Barber. 19 She makes no argument that Barber himself ever
communicated with her outside of the State of Texas. Indeed, Telford barely mentions Barber at
all in her opening brief, and the only mention of him involves an act he did in Texas. Addendum,
p. 25. 20 As for Beall and Perdue Brandon, the only act which involves them in this case was a
telephone call from Beall to Telford the day before Telford filed suit in Idaho, in which they

18

"An offer for a unilateral contract calls for acceptance only by rendition of the requested performance."
Deer Creek. Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch. Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 291, 688 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 1984).
If this rule had been applied to this case, then every potential bidder was entitled to demand performance of the
seller, which is clearly not the case.
19

As Barber has never been to Idaho, nor does he ever remember communicating with Telford in or out of
Texas, Telford could not show this. R. Vol. Supp., p. 123 (Barber Aff., ifif 123).
20

Even if Telford were to cite to the record discussing her interaction with Barber, it was all limited to in
person interactions in Texas. R. Vol. I, pp. 129, 132, 136, 142 (affidavits all discussing that the witnesses saw a
Smith County Employee talk with Barber while the witnesses were at the Smith County Tax Assessor's office, but
do not identify that the witnesses spoke with Barber himself).

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 14

discussed "any future suit [Telford] might bring." R. Vol. I, 144 (Telford Aff.,
26 (Complaint,

~

~

20). See Id., p.

12). A telephone call to Telford is hardly the sort of "tortious act" which would

subject one to the jurisdiction of the Idaho courts. A very similar result was reached in Wright v.

Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1972). In Wright, the plaintiff obtained a prescription in
South Dakota which, when she tried to refill them in Idaho, was required to obtain confirmation
of the prescription from her doctor in South Dakota. Id. at 288. After the doctor provided
confirmation of the prescription to parties in Idaho, the plaintiff attempted to argue that a tortious
act had been committed in Idaho. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that no tort occurred
within Idaho, and further stated that they found "no merit in appellant's contention that appellee's
gratuitous act of accommodation constituted the transaction of business within the State of Idaho
such as to confer jurisdiction under Idaho Code§ 5-514(a)." Id. at 291. The same should be true
in this case. Where Beall did no more than call Telford to discuss her case, he committed no act
(nor caused her any injury) within the State ofldaho.
As an aside, Telford only claims two potentially tortious acts: violation of the Consumer
Protection Act, and violation of the Utah Fraudulent Communications Act. R. Vol. I, p. 29. The
violation of the Utah Fraudulent Communications Act should not be deemed a tort within the
State of Idaho. 21 As to the Consumer Protection Act, it is not clear whether a claim under such
act is tortious, but even if it were, Telford alleges the only violations under the act were related to
selling the property. Addendum, p. 34. As discussed above, neither Barber, Beall, nor Perdue
Brandon sold the property at issue. Therefore, no tort could have possibly occurred under this
act.
21

Violation of a statute rarely results in a private right of action (particularly where the statute is from another
state). See Brock v. Bd o[Dirs., 134 Idaho 520, 523 (2000); Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, 127 Idaho 921, 926 (1995)
(private causes of action rarely arise out of violation of criminal statutes).
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As for Smith County, Respondents also contend that no business transaction nor tortious
act occurred in Idaho. First, it is not clear that that IC § 5-514 applies to Smith County. It
specifically states that "Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state" which commit the enumerated facts can be subject to jurisdiction.
IC. § 5-514. The plain language of the statute does not include foreign governments or their

subdivisions within its scope. 22
Assuming that the statute does apply to Smith County, no business transaction occurred
in Idaho. In order to bid on the property, Telford had to submit a sealed bid to Smith County. R.
Vol. Supp., pp. 123 - 24 (Barber Aff.). Telford filled out paper documents, and sent the

documents to Texas. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 127 - 33 (Barber Aff., Ex. A). When the bids were
announced, Telford had an agent present in Texas. R. Vol. I, pp. 134 - 35 (Vogt Aff.,

~

4). When

Telford discovered that there was a problem with the bid process, she went in person to the
Smith County Tax Assessor's office. R. Vol. I, pp. 141 - 42 (Telford Aff.

~

12). In any case,

Telford's bid was never accepted, nor was any payment ever made regarding her bid on the
property. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 124 (Barber Aff.

~~

15 - 16, 19). Telford never received a deed to the

property. Id. These facts show that no business transaction occurred in Idaho. Even if the
transaction had been consummated (i.e. even had her bid been accepted and had payment been
made), all of the relevant events occurred in Texas. Further, contrary to Telford's allegations,
Smith County did not own the property at issue. Addendum, p. 15. The property had been was
being sold by Smith County at a tax sale on behalf of Tyler Independent School District. R. Vol.
22

In Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr. v. State of Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 743, 852 P.2d 491, 495 (1993), this
Court seems to infer that the State of Washington could be subject to the Courts of Idaho under the long arm statute.
However, the issue of whether a state meets the definition of "person, firm, company, association or corporation" is
not addressed, and so it is possible that the parties in Saint Alphonsus waived the argument. Respondents do not
waive the argument, and contend that Smith County does not fall within the enumerated entities.
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Supp., p. 93 (Beall Aff.

~

23).

The definition of transacting business includes "realizing

pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or
corporation." IC § 5-514(a). Telford cannot show and has not shown that Smith County would
have realized any benefit by the sale of the property. Therefore, Telford cannot show any
business was transacted.
Further, the connection of the sale of property to the State of Idaho is very tenuous.
Telford only found out about the tax sale by looking at the Smith County website. R. Vol. I, p. 23
(Complaint~

4). An advertisement of this nature is insufficient to create jurisdiction under the

long arm statute. This Court has held that evidence of
an advertisement, standing by itself, is insufficient to rebut corporate denials of
activities within a state. A similar holding was reached in Jacobs v. Lakewood
Aircraft Service, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 46 (E.D.Pa.1980), where the court held that
jurisdiction would not be predicated on advertising alone absent a showing that
defendant launched an intensive and sustained advertising campaign in the forum
state itself.
Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., Inc., 104 Idaho 210, 214, 657 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1983). A
similar result was reached inAkichika v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 932, 539 P.2d 283, 285 (1975).
In Akichika, the plaintiff, while in Boise, found an advertisement of a vehicle for sale near
Portland, Oregon. Id. The plaintiff went to Portland and purchased the truck, and brought it back
to Idaho. Id. Upon discovering problems with the truck, the plaintiff refused to pay the remainder
of the purchase price owed, and ultimately sued the seller. Id. This Court found that neither the
business transaction nor tortious act provisions of IC § 5-514 applied. Id. at 933, 286. The rule
from Schneider and Akichika shows that even if an advertisement is known or found by an Idaho
resident, such advertisement alone does not create jurisdiction, particularly where the
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advertisement is not focused at the State of Idaho.
In contrast with these cases, compare S. Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe &
Supplv. Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 497, 567 P.2d 1246, 1248 (1977) and Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler,
LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 725, 152 P.3d 594, 596 (2007). In S. Idaho Pipe, though the defendant did

not have any physical presence in Idaho, it had numerous contracts with Idaho residents, sent its
goods into Idaho, and sent circulars and sales flyers to potential clients in Idaho. S. Idaho Pipe &
Steel Co., 98 Idaho at 497, 567 P.2d at 1248. This Court found that such behavior was sufficient

to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. In Blimka, the defendant was a Maine
corporation who sold goods over the internet. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725, 152 P.3d at 596. The
plaintiff (who found out about the defendant through the internet) ordered goods from the
defendant, who shipped the goods to the plaintiff in Idaho. Id. The goods were deemed
nonconforming, and this lawsuit followed. This Court found that while Blimka had some
similarities to Akichika, unlike Akichika, "the allegedly fraudulent representations were directed
at an Idaho resident and the injury occurred in this state." Blimka, 143 Idaho at 727, 152 P.3d at
598.
Telford's situation resembles that of the plaintiff in Akichika. Telford found an
advertisement for the sale of real property in Texas, and like the plaintiff in Akichika, left Idaho
to inspect the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 131 - 32 (Greer Aff.

~

3). Telford bid on the property, and

(without receiving a deed), again went to Texas to take possession. As the Court said in
Akichika, the seller's communications and connections with Idaho were "only incidental to the

transaction, and not an integral part of the transaction at issue." Akichika, 96 Idaho at 933, 539
P.2d at 286. Therefore, Respondents request that this Court determine that no jurisdiction exists
over Smith County under IC. § 5-514(a).
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As to the tortious injury prong, the analysis for Smith County is the same as for the other
Respondents. As Judge Dunn noted, there is "some skepticism as to whether [Telford] has
asserted any tort claims in this case." R. Vol. III, p. 416. Regardless of whether a tort was
actually claimed, the cases indicate that a tort may have occurred in Idaho if "the injury occurred
in this state." Blimka, at 727, 598. See also Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med Ctr. v. State of Wash.,
123 Idaho 739, 743, 852 P.2d 491, 495 (1993). There is no doubt that no injury has occurred in
this state. Telford cannot show that she actually paid for the property. If she did not obtain title to

the property, that was the result of an allegedly faulty tax sale which occurred in Texas over
property which is located in Texas.
Telford contends that there were numerous telephone conversations which occurred
related to the property, and which connect this matter to Idaho. Even if the telephone
conversations Telford alleges occurred23 , they create no more jurisdiction than did the telephone
conversations which took place in Akichika. In that case, this Court found that the defendant's
"contacts with Idaho-a phone call from Akichika inquiring about the truck, use of an Idaho bank
as an agent for transfer of title, and Kelleher's attempts to repossess the truck at Akichika's farmwere only incidental to the transaction, and not an integral part of the transaction at issue."
Akichika, 96 Idaho at 933, 539 P.2d at 286. The same is true in this case. Telford is only able to

23

Telford alleges that there were "9 phone calls, 2 faxes, and 6 emails sent into the state of Idaho by the
Defendants." Addendum, p. 36. This allegation fails to identify which "defendant" she is talking about, so it is
unclear whether she is referring to any of the Respondents or not. Further, Telford cites to R. Vol. II, p. 273, which is
not an affidavit or statement of facts, but is instead one of her briefs below. What she is citing to is a section
heading, which constitutes nothing more than an allegation. "In summary judgment proceedings, a party may not
rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts." Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 897, 865 P.2d 985, 988
(Ct. App. 1993). The Court could spend hours attempting to verify each of Telford's allegations by digging through
the record, but the Court should not have to do that. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 383, 234
P.3d 699, 707 (2010). See also Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (it
is unfair to force the Court to look for issues of fact not identified by the parties); Nilsson, Robbins. Dalgarn,
Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
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show phone calls between herself and a Smith County employee, which phone calls were to let
Telford know that she had submitted the only bid. R. Vol. I, pp. 24 (Complaint,, 7), 141 (Telford
Aff. , 9). Every other communication between Telford and Smith County (including the initial
bid on the property) took place in Texas. This is vastly different from the situation in Blimka,
where the plaintiff made numerous communications (including calls and e-mails) to the
defendant (a Maine corporation), formed a contract over the phone, and the defendant shipped
approximately 16,000 bales of jeans to the plaintiff in Idaho. See Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725, 152
P.3d at 596. In this case, no property was (or could have been) shipped to Idaho. Therefore,
Respondents contend that no tortious act could have occurred in Idaho which would create
personal jurisdiction over Respondents.
As an aside, though Telford does not specifically argue that Smith County's website
should be sufficient to confer jurisdiction, she does vaguely address the issue. See Addendum, p.
9. The record clearly shows that even if Telford did learn of the tax sale on Smith County's
website, she in no way utilized the website to transact the purchase. She submitted a paper copy
of a sealed bid to Smith County, as required by law. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 123 (Barber Aff., 12),
127 - 34 (Barber Aff. Exs. A and B). It is generally accepted that maintenance of an
informational website does not create jurisdiction in a particular state if the website is not
directed at that state. See Bush v. Tidewater Marine Alaska, Inc., 1:97CV656, 1998 WL 560048
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 1998) ("the posting, without more, of an ordinary website homepage on
the world-wide web is insufficient to expose distant parties to in personam jurisdiction even
though accessible by Texas residents"); Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 995 F.
Supp. 761, 765 (W.D. Ky. 1997) ("the mere fact that Internet users in Kentucky can view
advertisements on web pages provided by Speedvision and Primestar falls far short of
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demonstrating that Defendants advertise in Kentucky."); Fernandez v. McDaniel Controls, Inc.,
999 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D. Haw. 1998) (internet advertisements alone insufficient to create
jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Patriot
Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (website which provides

information is not sufficient to create jurisdiction); Skrodzki v. Marcello, 810 F. Supp. 2d 501,
514 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (same). Further, the Illinois courts24 have stated that it doesn't matter
whether a website is "active" or "passive".
[W]e find that the web page's level of interactivity is irrelevant. In reality, an
interactive website is similar to telephone or mail communications. A passive
website is much the same as advertising on the radio or in a magazine. An ad on
the Internet is no different than an ad in any other medium that provides a
telephone number or other means to contact a potential defendant. It is mere
advertisement or solicitation of business. Illinois courts have long held that a mere
advertisement or solicitation is not enough to sustain personal jurisdiction in
Illinois.
Howard v. Missouri Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 738, 743, 869 N.E.2d 207, 212

(2007). Idaho Courts have similarly held that advertisements are insufficient, in and of
themselves, to create personal jurisdiction. See Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., Inc., 104
Idaho 210, 214, 657 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1983). To the extent that Smith County's website
advertised the tax sale, Respondents contend that such advertisement is insufficient to create
jurisdiction, and request that this Court affirm the Judgment.
2.

Exercising Jurisdiction over the Respondents Would Violate Constitutional Due
Process.

Even if the defendants had acted in a way which allowed for jurisdiction under the Idaho
long arm statute, exercising personal jurisdiction would still be inappropriate if such exercise

24

The Idaho long arm statute is based on the Illinois long arm statute, so this analysis is particularly relevant.
See lntermountain Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 541, 531 P.2d 1183, 1186 (1975).
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violates the requirements of due process. See McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50
P.3d 983, 986 (2002); Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. State of Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 742,
852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993). 25 This Court has stated the following with regard to constitutional
exercises of personal jurisdiction:
The Due Process Clause requires that a non-resident defendant have "fair warning
that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign," and "gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 85
L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218, 97 S.Ct. 2569,
2587, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) and Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62
L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). It is axiomatic that before a state can exercise jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant, the defendant must "purposefully [avail] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." Schneider [v. Sverdsten Logging Co.Z, 104 Idaho at
212, 657 P.2d at 1080, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct.
1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
Due process does not require the physical presence of the defendant in the forum
state, Southern Idaho Pipe re. Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supplv. Inc., 98 Idaho
495, 497, 567 P.2d 1246, 1248 (1977), but it prohibits an Idaho court from
exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant unless that
defendant has certain minimum contacts with Idaho such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Schneider, 104 Idaho at 212, 657 P.2d at 1080 citing International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The
minimum contacts required by International Shoe are supplied if the defendant
'"purposefully directs' his activities at residents of the forum state and the
litigation arises out of or relates to those activities." Houghland Farms, Inc., 119
Idaho at 76, 803 P.2d at 982, quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477, 105
S.Ct. at 2182.

Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 123 Idaho at 743-44, 852 P.2d at 495-96. Respondents cannot
find any argument in Telford's opening brief regarding whether exercising personal jurisdiction
25

See also Wheaton Equip. Co. v. Franmar. Inc., CVOS-276-S-EJL, 2009 WL 464337 at *4 (D. Idaho Feb.
24, 2009) (suggesting that the Idaho long arm statute may allow for exercise of jurisdiction over more acts than
constitutional due process would allow).
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over the Respondents comports with constitutional due process. As this was a fundamental basis
for dismissing Telford's claims, see R. Vol. II, pp. 309 - 11 and R. Vol. III, pp. 420 - 22,
Respondents contend that Telford's failure to address this issue constitutes a waiver of this issue
on appeal 26 and ask that the Judgment be affirmed on this basis.
To the extent that this Court finds that Telford did raise the issue, Respondents contend
that constitutional due process would be violated if personal jurisdiction were exercised over
Respondents.
States may exercise general or specific jurisdiction over non-resident defendants,
consistent with due process protections. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404
(1984). General jurisdiction exists if a defendant's contacts with the forum state
are "continuous and systematic," Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, and the exercise
of jurisdiction satisfies "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Reebok Int'! Ltd v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.1995).

Wheaton Equip. Co. v. Franmar, Inc., CV08-276-S-EJL, 2009 WL 464337 (D. Idaho Feb. 24,
2009). There is no evidence of any continuous and systematic contacts between any of the
Respondents and Idaho. 27 Therefore, an exercise of general jurisdiction would be inappropriate.
Specific jurisdiction is only appropriate if
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privileges of conducting
activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forumrelated activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

26

"When a party presents no authority relating to an issue asserted on appeal, the issue is deemed waived."
State v. Aguilar, 135 Idaho 894, 897, 26 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Ct. App. 2001).
27

The opposite is true, as none of the Respondents have any contacts with Idaho. See R. Vol. Supp., pp. 87 94 (Beall and Darlow Affs.), 117 25 (Barber and Springerley Affs.).
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Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). 28 Regardless of whether the
9th Circuit or Saint Alphonsus test applies, the result should be the same: there aren't sufficient
contacts with Idaho to subject Respondents to personal jurisdiction. With regard to Smith County
and Barber, there was no activity directed toward Idaho. Instead, it was Telford who initiated all
contacts by travelling to Texas to research the property, and by submitting a bid. As for Beall
and Perdue Brandon, Beall's one phone call to Idaho (during which nothing more happened than
that an opinion was given) is insufficient for a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction29 •
Saint Alphonsus itself gives a good outline of what sort of communications do not create
specific jurisdiction in Idaho. In that case, St. Alphonsus provided medical services to patrons
"eligible for benefits under Washington's worker's compensation laws." Saint Alphonsus Reg'l
Med Ctr., 123 Idaho at 741, 852 P.2d at 493. St. Alphonsus then submitted bills to the State of
Washington, and received payment in turn for several years. Id. at 742, 494. This Court
identified numerous contacts between the State of Washington and St. Alphonsus between 1984
and 1988, but still held that an exercise of jurisdiction was inappropriate, because Washington
did not initiate the contacts. Id. at 744 - 45, 496 - 97.
Washington neither instigated nor attempted to foster its relationship with St.
Alphonsus. St. Alphonsus voluntarily chose to participate in Washington's
worker's compensation system by treating Washington patients and then sending
the bill to Washington. St. Alphonsus then voluntarily chose to continue
participating in the program after being apprised of changes in the repayment rate.
Id. at 745, 497. The same is true in this case. Telford initiated all of the contacts with Smith

28

This test is similar to the test relied on by Judge Dunn. See R. Vol. II, p. 310 (citing to Boschetto v.
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008)). Both Boschetto and Dole Food Co., Inc. cite to Lake v. Lake, 817
F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987).
29

Even if Beall's phone call could be considered as an activity directed toward Idaho, Telford cannot show
that the claims against him arose out of the phone call, as the phone call occurred after Telford was notified that the
property was redeemed. R. Vol. I, p. 144 (Telford Aff., 20). Therefore, the second part of the test is not met.
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County, and any phone calls30 or communications to Telford as a result of her initiating
communications are merely incidental to her initial communications.
Because none of the Respondents could reasonably have expected to have been haled into
Idaho based on the contacts with Telford, an exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate
constitutional due process. Therefore, Respondents request that the Judgment be affirmed.

B.

RESPONDENTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR SPECIAL APPEARANCE BY
JOINING MULTIPLE DEFENSES TOGETHER IN THEIR MOTION TO
DISMISS BECAUSE I.R.CP. 4(i) & 12(g) SPECIFICALLY ALLOW FOR
ADDITIONAL DEFENSES TO BE JOINED.
Telford contends that Respondents waived their special appearance by joining multiple

defenses together. Addendum, p. 44. 31 Telford puts extraordinarily little substance into her
argument on this issue, citing neither caselaw nor rule supporting her contention. Based on
Telford's failure to provide legal support alone, this Court should decline to address this issue.
See Trotter v. Bank o{New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 848, 275 P.3d 857, 863 (2012) (When a
party mentions an "argument only in passing and without supporting argument or authority, the
argument is waived and [the Court declines] to consider it."). See also IA.R. 35(a)(6) (argument
must be supported "the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
transcript and record relied upon").
Despite the fact that Telford did not provide any support to this argument, Respondents
contend that no rule was violated when they joined a number of defenses together. Respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that there was no personal jurisdiction, which is
allowed under IR.C.P. 12(b)(2). Other defenses were joined in this motion. IR.C.P. 4(i) states
30

Including Beall's telephone call at Smith County's request. R. Vol. Supp., p. 93 (Beall Aff. if 22).

31

Telford cites to "C.R. 67-89". Addendum, p. 44. However, it is unclear what this means, as R. Vol. I, pp. 67
- 89 are her various petitions for default judgment. If she is referring to R. Vol. Supp., pp. 67 - 89, that only refers to
the arguments of Beall and Perdue Brandon, and not to any other party.
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that "The joinder of other defenses in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5) does not constitute
a voluntary appearance by the party under this rule." IR. C.P. 12(g) further states that motions to
dismiss under IR. C.P. 12(b)(2) are not waived "by being joined with one or more other motions
or by filing a special appearance as provided in Rule 4(i)(2)." As this Court has stated,
Rule 4(i) further provides that the voluntary appearance or service of any pleading
by a party constitutes voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the
court "except as provided herein." It then lists three exceptions. First, filing a
motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) does not constitute a voluntary
appearance. Second, filing a motion asserting anv other defense does not
constitute a voluntary appearance if it is joined with a motion under Rule
l 2(b){2), (4), or (5). Finally, filing a pleading and defending the lawsuit does not
constitute a voluntary appearance if it is done after the trial court has denied the
party's motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5).

Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 322, 193 P.3d 866, 869 (2008) (emphasis added)
(quoting Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 85, 44 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2002)). Because
Respondents filed a special appearance, as allowed by IR.C.P. 4(i), which was followed within
14 days by a Motion to Dismiss under IR.C.P. 12(b)(2), Respondents should not be deemed to
have made a general appearance or to have waived their personal jurisdiction arguments.

C.

THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON ALTERNATE GROUNDS,
INCLUDING LACK OF VENUE AND IMPROPER SERVICE, WHICH
ARGUMENTS WERE PRESENTED TO JUDGE DUNN.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that respondents are not "limited to the issues decided

by the trial court or the issues raised by the appellant. The respondent can seek to sustain a
judgment for reasons that were presented to the trial court even though they were not addressed
or relied upon by the trial court in its decision." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co.

Inc., 153 Idaho 735, 291 P.3d 418, 425 (2012). See also Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho
991, 993, 739 P.2d 290, 292 (1987); IA.R. ll(g), 15(a), 35(b)(4).
In addition to the arguments regarding personal jurisdiction, Respondents contended that
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Telford improperly served the Complaint and Summons, and that venue in Idaho is inappropriate
as all of the Respondents are Texas residents. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 72 - 75, 104 - 08. Judgment
should be affirmed on these grounds.
1.

Because Telford Served the Complaint and Summons by Mail, Service was
Improper, and the Court has no Jurisdiction over Respondents.

Respondents contended that dismissal was appropriate because Telford improperly
served them. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 72 - 74, 104 - 06. Telford admits that she served each of the
defendants by mail. Addendum, p. 32. In fact, that is one of her primary arguments. 32 Addendum,
pp. 32 - 33. Telford contends that because she brought a claim under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, she is allowed to serve via mail, relying on IC. § 48-613. Addendum, p. 32. This
argument is misguided on several grounds. First, a civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint. IR.C.P. 3(a)(l). IC. § 48-613 makes no reference to a complaint or summons, and
instead only refers to a "notice, demand, or subpoena." IC. § 48-613. The service allowed under
that statute does not refer to the initiation of a lawsuit, as is made clear by IC. § 48-613(3),
which states "substituted service therefor may be made in the following manner: ... (3) As to
any person other than a natural person, in the manner provided in the Idaho rules of civil
procedure as if a complaint which institutes a civil proceeding had been filed." If this statute
were intended to apply to service of complaints and summonses, it would not have allowed
service "as if a complaint ... had been filed." The title of the statute itself refers to "Service of
Notice," and not service of a complaint or summons. IC. § 48-613. The service discussed in IC.
§ 48-613 refers to the demand made by the attorney general when investigating alleged

32

This is not a primary issue for Respondents, as Judge Dunn dismissed the claims against Respondents on
personal jurisdiction grounds. However, as it forms an alternate basis for affirming the appeal, Respondents address
this argument.
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wrongdoing under the statute, not the service of a complaint that starts a civil action. See IC. §§
48-611 and 48-612. Telford's alleged service of a complaint and summons does not fall within
the powers granted to the Idaho Attorney General under these statutes.
Second, rules of services are governed by JR.C.P. 4. In this case, two of the Respondents
(Beall and Barber) are individuals, one is a governmental entity (Smith County), and one is a
business entity located in the state of Texas (Perdue Brandon). For individuals, service must be
made in person, by delivering it to the individual's house, or by leaving it with an agent. IR.C.P.
4(d)(2). Service upon foreign corporations, such as Perdue Brandon, must be made
by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an officer, managing or
general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by statute of
this state to receive service of process, and upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer or the managing
or general agent of the partnership or association, or to any other agent authorized
by appointment or by statute of this state to receive service of process.
1.R. C.P. 4(d)( 4)(A). Service may be made by mail if the person to be served is a state official,

and a statute requires mailing a copy of service. Id. Service may also be made by mail only if,
after due diligence, a plaintiff cannot find a designated agent or officer or managing agent.
l.R.C.P. 4(d)(4)(B). 33 As to Smith County, "service shall be made by delivering a copy of the

summons and complaint to the chief executive officer or the secretary or clerk thereof." l.R.C.P.
4(d)(5). Telford complied with none of these requirements, as she served each of the
Respondents by mail. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 89, 93, 119. 34
33

However, service by mail under those circumstances must be made by sending the summons and
complaint, via certified or registered mail, to the secretary or president of the corporation, at the address located on
the Corporation's most recent annual statement filed with the Secretary of State. 1.R.C.P. 4(d)(4)(B) Further,
compliance with the mailing rule must be shown by the party affecting service by mail. Id.
34

To the extent that Perdue Brandon was served by mail, it was served improperly, as the letter was sent to
Tab Beall, who is not the registered agent. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 89, 93. This does not comply with the requirements of
l.R. C.P. 4(d)(4)(B).
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The reason that failure of service is important is because until a defendant is served
properly, the court generally has no jurisdiction over that defendant. Under JR.C.P. 12(b)(4) and
12(b)(5), insufficient process and service of process are grounds for dismissal. A court does not
have jurisdiction over a defendant unless and until the defendant has been properly served.
Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th

Cir. 1988); Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503, 503 - 04, 23 L. Ed. 398 (1875). "When service of
process is challenged, the party on whose behalf it is made must bear the burden of establishing
its validity." Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d
434, 435 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has failed to show that she complied with the rules of service.
"Strict compliance is required with the rules governing manner of service." Duran v. MaciasPrice, 07CV01209AWISMS, 2007 WL 4554390 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2007). If service is

invalid, any proceedings against the party improperly served are void. See Mooney Aircraft. Inc.
v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1968); Earle, 91 U.S. at 509.

Thus, because there was improper service (and Telford's refusal to serve within the six
month time frame allowed by JR.C.P. 4(a)(2)35 ), dismissal of the case was an appropriate course
of action. See Stevens v. Sec. Pac. Nat. Bank, 538 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1976) (courts have
the discretion to dismiss a case for improper service). See also JR.C.P. 12(b)(4) & (5). Even if
this Court were to conclude that Respondents had waived their jurisdictional arguments, no
jurisdiction exists over Respondents as a matter of course until proper service has been
completed. Therefore, dismissal is appropriate, and Respondents request that this Court affirm
Judge Dunn's judgment on these alternate grounds.

35

See R. Vol. III, pp. 399 - 400 (Telford determined not to serve any of the defendants as required by the
rules so that she could "jump start" the appeal).
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2.

Because all of the Respondents are Texas Residents, and because Venue Cannot
be Transferred to an Idaho County which is more Convenient to the Respondents,
Dismissal was Appropriate.

Respondents also contended that venue was improper, on the grounds that none of the
Respondents were located in Idaho. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 74 - 75, 106 - 08. Because there was no
county in Idaho under which venue would be appropriate, the case should be dismissed. Id.
Under Idaho law, venue is clearly inappropriate within this state. First, both Idaho and Texas law
require that when a county is being sued, it be sued within that county. See IC §§ 6-915 and 5403; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 15.015 ("An action against a county shall be brought in that
county."). In addition to the fact that venue is improper under law, Idaho is clearly a forum non
conveniens. As one court stated,

It is held by the great weight of authority that an action against a municipal
corporation, whatever the character of the action, is inherently local, and must be
brought in the county in which the municipality is situated. It is considered to be
of the greatest importance to the welfare of such bodies, and of the citizens whom
they serve, that their officers should be permitted to remain at home and discharge
their public duties, instead of being called hither and thither over different parts of
the state to attend to litigation.
Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 258 (Miss. 1940). Thus, as regards Smith County and
Barber, both can only be sued in Texas, regardless of whether Idaho or Texas law applies.
Second, Telford's Complaint clearly seeks a determination regarding her right to the
property at issue. R. Vol. I, p. 27 (requesting that the Court order a deed to the property be
delivered to her). Idaho law states that:
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the subject
of the action or some part thereof is situated, subject to the power of the court to
change the place of trial, as provided in this code:
1. For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or {Or the
determination in anv {Orm of such right or interest and for injuries to real
property.
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IC. § 5-40 I. As the property at issue is located in Texas, this statute would require that the trial
be held in Smith County.
Third, there is a clear indication that venue is preferential for where defendants are
located, and not where the plaintiff is located. See, e.g., JC § 5-404. The Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure indicate that venue may be changed for "the convenience of witnesses and [that] the
ends of justice would be promoted by the change." lR.C.P. 40(e)(l)(C). There are numerous
reasons why venue is inappropriate in Oneida County, or anywhere in the State of Idaho. As
discussed above, claims against certain Respondents must be tried in Texas. Additionally, with
the exception of Telford, all of the defendants are located out of state. See R. Vol. I, p. 23
(Complaint if 3). The land at issue is located in Texas, the witnesses are located in Texas 36 , and
Plaintiff herself or her agents went to Texas a number of times to deal with this issue. Addendum,
pp. 17, 20. See also R. Vol. I, pp. 24 - 25. Texas is or should be the proper venue for this case.
Though typically the result of a motion pursuant to !R.C.P. 12(b)(3) would be for the
Court to order a change of venue, see lR.C.P. 40(e), there does not appear to be any authority for
an Idaho court to transfer a case filed in Idaho to the courts of Texas. lR.C.P. 40(e)(2).
Therefore, the proper disposition of this case would be to dismiss the causes of action and allow
Telford to file her claims in the proper location, which would be in the state of Texas.
Respondents therefore request that this Court affirm Judge Dunn's dismissal of Telford's claims
on the grounds that proper venue cannot be found within the state of Idaho.
D.

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.
Respondents contend that they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to l C. §§ 12-117,

36

See R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 26 (Complaint iii! 4 - 12), identifying witnesses located in Smith County, Texas.
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12-120 and 12-121. For purposes of this appeal, it is unclear which of these statutes would apply.
In some circumstances, IC. § 12-117 supersedes IC. § 12-121, and potentially all other attorney
fee statutes. See Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226
P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010) (IC. § 12-117 held to be exclusive over other statutes). However, when
a contract applies, IC. § 12-120 is the source of attorney fees. Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138
Idaho 131, 136, 59 P .3d 302, 307 (2002). Respondents will argue under each of these statutes.
First, attorney fees are awarded as a matter of right under l C. § 12-120 when there is a
commercial transaction at issue. IC. § 12-120(3). See also Downey Chiropractic Clinic v.

Nampa Rest. Corp., 127 Idaho 283, 287-88, 900 P.2d 191, 195-96 (1995) (award under IC. § 12120(3) is mandatory when it applies); Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 481, 835
P.2d 1282, 1292 (1992) (same). In order for IC. § 12-120(3) to apply, "the commercial
transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party is attempting
to recover." Lettunich v. Kev Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368-69, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110-11
(2005). Telford brought claims for "specific performance on bid purchase contract," and for
breach of contract R. Vol. I, pp. 27 - 28. This Court has stated that claims related to bids for
purchase of real property fall within the scope of commercial transactions addressed by this
statute. See Taylor v. Just. 138 Idaho 137, 142, 59 P.3d 308, 313 (2002). Further, the fact that
Telford could not have prevailed on her claim, or even that it ultimately was not a breach of
contract claim at all, does not prevent this statute from applying. "Where a party alleges the
existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by I.C. § 12-120(3), that claim triggers
the application of the statute, and the prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability
under a contract was established." Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 271 P.3d
703, 711-12 (2012), reh'g denied (Mar. 12, 2012). See also Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 32

Idaho 904, 911, 104 P.3d 946, 953 (2004) (same). Therefore, to the extent that Telford alleged a
breach of contract on a commercial transaction (and requested specific performance thereof),
Respondents are entitled to attorney fees even though, under the District Court's ruling, there
was no personal jurisdiction over Respondents. 37
With regard to JC §§ 12-11738 and 12-121 39 , both have a similar standard. JC. § 12-117
allows fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit against a political subdivision if the Court finds
"that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." IC § 12-117(1).

IC § 12-121 allows attorney fees to the prevailing party generally, but has been interpreted to
have a similar standard to IC. § 12-117:
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to
the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left
with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009). See also !R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
With regard to this appeal, Respondents contend that it was brought frivolously and maliciously.
Telford apparently is incapable of refraining from appealing an issue, even when it is clear that
there is no basis for doing so. There are many factors showing that this appeal (as well as the
lawsuit as a whole) is without foundation:
As discussed above, Judge Dunn properly determined that there is no personal
jurisdiction over these Respondents. Telford's entire basis for concluding that there is
jurisdiction over Respondents is that she signed a contract in Idaho. Addendum, pp. 36 38. However, the fact that she bid on a property did not create a contract, and even if it
did, that only applies to Smith County, and not to Beall, Perdue Brandon, or Barber.
37

Respondents contend that I. C. § 12-120(3) applies to each of them (including Smith County and Barber),
regardless of whether they are a governmental subdivision or employee thereof.

38

J.C. § 12-117 would only apply to Smith County, which fits the definition of political subdivision. J.C. §
12-l 17(5)(b) (not limiting the definition to subdivisions ofthe State ofldaho).

39

J.C. § 12-121 applies to Barber, Beall, and Perdue Brandon. To the extent that J.C. § 12-117 is limited to
political subdivisions of the State ofldaho only, then J.C. § 12-121 also applies to Smith County.
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Further, she mailed the bid to Texas. R. Vol. Supp., pp. 127 - 34. This is insufficient to
create jurisdiction in Idaho over any of the Respondents.
Telford provided no argument as to why Respondents allegedly made a general
appearance. Addendum, pp. 44. The only way Telford could conclude that Respondents
had made a general appearance is by completely ignoring the plain language of !R.C.P. 4
and 12, and multiple cases from the Idaho Supreme Court. 40
Telford's only basis for including Beall and Perdue Brandon in this lawsuit was a phone
call discussing the potential lawsuit. Telford has not even tried to show how this phone
call caused her any injury.
Telford has almost completely failed to mention Barber in this brief at all.
With regard to Respondents, Telford has failed to present any argument or citation
discussing the grounds on which Judge Dunn granted judgment. She did not discuss the
constitutional jurisdiction issues, and spent all of her discussion under the long arm
statute discussing the wrong statute.
Simply stated, there is no basis for this appeal, either factually or legally. It is frivolous
and harassing, and serves no basis except to annoy and cause further expense. Therefore,
Respondents request that fees be assessed against Telford under the statutes outlined above.
As to costs, if the Respondents prevail on appeal, they are entitled to costs pursuant to

IR. C.P. 54 and !A.R. 40 as the prevailing party.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents request that this Court determine that there is no
personal jurisdiction over Respondents, and affirm the Judgment.

40

See § IV.B., above.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2cJctay of February, 2013.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of final orders entered by the trial judge which held that a

sales contract for real property located in Smith County Texas could not be enforced,
challenged or interpreted in the state of Idaho - irregardless of the profound personal and
financial injury resulting to Plaintiff,

an Idaho resident, and other Idaho residents who

vested monies into the commerciai transaction at hand.
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court's ruling with regards to Plaintiffs access to
Idaho c-0urts to seek judicial relief from the Defendant's contract breaches,

violated

l.C.

29-110 which makes void any contract conditions which restrict an Idaho resident from
enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho tribunals.
The Trial Court also failed to conduct any competent analysis under the tortious
injury clause of the Idaho Long arm statute as it applied to Plaintiffs Idaho Consumer
Protection Act claim

- which subsumes personal torts such as conversion, intentional

infliction of emotional and mental distress, fraud and deception. The trial court summarily
concluded that this cause of action was not a tort claim requiring a tortious injury analysis.
In addition, absolutely no jurisdictional analysis was directed towards plaintiffs
RICO cause of action because Plaintiff stated this cause of action under Utah law instead
of Idaho law and because there is no personal jurisdictional guideline under Idaho law
for RICO acts committed by out of state residents within the 4 corners of the state as
there is under federal law.
Furthermore, Plaintiff attempted to amend her underlying complaint when the
defendants colluded with Idaho executive officials to criminally prosecute plaintiffs for
felony fraud crimes in order to taint the underlying litigation and win by default.

The trial

court rejected this amendment which would have added additional "personal jurisdictional"
credence to Plaintiffs already existing RICO claims.
Last but not least,

Plaintiff served the Defendant under Idaho's Consumer

Protection Act's long arm service statute.

l.C. Section 48-613. The only defendants that

appeared in the underlying action, albiet late, were the Smith County defendants, their
employees and a Texas lawfirm that was instrumental in converting plaintiff's properties by
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The remaining defendants were admittedly served

under this long arm statute by certified mail, but chose not to appear in the action.
Plaintiff filed the required applications for default certificates and default judgments as
required under Idaho law,
defendants.

and served these documents upon each of the defaulting

More than one month later, on July 15, 2011, Judge Dunn issued an order

finding that because the Consumer Protection Act's long arm service statute did not
include the words Summons and complaint in it's description of process to be served,

the statute was not effective for service of a lawsuit upon the defendants.
the court found that

Accordingly,

Plaintiff had not effected proper service on the non-appearing

defendants, and hence refused to enter defaults and default judgments against the
remaining "noticed", but non-appearing defendants.

II.

Course of Proceedings
The underlying complaint asserts that the Smith County Defendants with

the aid of their attorney lawfirm the former defaulting owners, breached a land sales
contract for undeveloped property located in Smith County Texas;

thereby causing

substantial financiai and tortious injury to plaintiff in the state of Idaho.

Plaintiff also

argued an Idaho RICO claim against the defendants for theft by unauthorized transfer,
theft by false promise, theft by extortion, and extortion by a public servant. Aff. Telford,
para.3, C.R. 138.
Plaintiff caused all defendants to be served the Summons and Complaint under
Idaho's long arm service statute, l.C. Section 48-613, based on the inclusion of NOTICE
in the text of the statute.

The Idaho Supreme Court publishes default papers under it's

website which mandates the entry of

default

judgment against a non-appearing

Defendant after receiving NOTICE of an action taken against that Defendant. The point
here being,

the words Summons and Complaint are not included in the body of the

FORM default papers published by the Idaho Supreme court. Plaintiff contends that she
made proper service on all defendants be serving them by certified mail as permitted by
this statute. The specially appearing defendants all admitted that they had been served
by certified mail.

When

the time expired

for responding

to Plaintiffs complaint,

Plaintiff
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demanded default certificates and default judgments be entered against all non-appearing
defendants. See C.R. 43 -121 ans C.Supp. R. 12-59.
On July 15, 2011, Judge Dunn instructed the clerk not to enter the defaults and
default judgments against the non-appearing Defendants because the statute did not
include the word summons in it's body and therefore Plaintiff was required to employ
personal on the out-of-state defendants.
The County defendants and their attorneys and lawfirm in the meantime made
a special appearance in the action moving to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction based on a general contacts analysis with the state.

Plaintiff responded

indicating that the contacts analysis was specific and in support thereof,

Plaintiff

provided very inculpitory evidence against the Defendants which she attached to her
July 18, 2011 Affidavit.

As a matter of coarse, Plaintiff files her documents with the

court clerk and then faxes these documents to the judge for his records as required under
IRCP Rule 7.
Immediately after Plaintiff submitted her July 18, 2011

Affidavit to the

Defendant's mutual defense firm/counsel colluded with Oneida County executive officials
to raid Telford's home on August 10, 2011 in order to seize all of plaintiffs original
electronic and paper evidence against these defendants and thereby obstruct proving the
underlyng action.
Telford filed a verified objection with the court on August 18 2011 indicating
that she was demanding from the criminal court the return of all of her electronic and
paper records regarding the underlying action.

See C.R. 192-260.

As exhibit "3"

attached to Telford's Verified Objection, C.R. 220-247, Telford provided Judge Dunn with
a copy of her mandamus writ directed to the criminal court and demanding the return of
all of Telford's electronic and paper evidence seized during the aforesaid illegal search.
On September 1, 2011, plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Defendant's motion
to dismiss.

Plaintiff argued that theDefendants had made a general appearance by

arguing beyond personal jurisdiction issues.

For example, the Defendants asked the

Judge to dismiss Plaintiff's action entirely with prejudice

as barred by the Statute of

Frauds because Plaintiff's interest in the Texas property was not committed in writing by
delivery of a written Deed.

Plaintiff cited to the affidavits of more than 5 affiants including
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herself which showed numerous oral promises made by the Defendants ;
induced part performance by plaintiff;

all of which

performances which caused substantial injury to

plaintiff and the other affiants supporting Plaintiffs Opposition to the motion to dismiss,
sufficient to avoid application of the statute of frauds and to invoke a constructive trust.
C.R. 273-277.

The Defendants also argued that plaintiff could not sustain an Idaho

RICO prosecution against the Defendants because Plaintiff was not a state prosecutor
and therefore could not prosecute crimes. Plaintiff cited to US Supreme Court law in re
Rotella v. Wood; 528 US 549 (2000) for the legal conclusion by the US Supreme Court
that State and Federal RICO statutes allow a private plaintiff to act as a private attorney
general and prosecute named crimes protected by the relevant RICO statutes. C.R. 278279.

Finally, the Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not state any variation of a fraud

crime against the Defendants or statutory liability claim under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act.
On October 3, 2011,

District Judge Dunn entered a decision on the

Defendants motion to Dismiss, converting same to a summary judgment motion based
on Telford's considerable evidence submitted outside the four corners of the Complaint.

Judge Dunn restricted his decision to the issue of personal jurisdiction rejecting
any need to reach the substance of Plaintiffs causes of action.

Judge Dunn's

Decision was based largely upon Telford's July 18, 2011 affidavit with attached exhibits
sent to Judge Dunn's chambers by fax on August 1, 2011.
300 - 315.

The Decision is found@ C.R.

Judge Dunn took on the mantle of defendant's attorney and assumed or

fabricated facts not in the record.
First, Judge Dunn concluded that the sales contract accepted
by Telford was formed in Texas - which was blatently false given
there would have been no contract without Telford's money
consideration to form the contract and which monies and Telford's
acceptance generated from the state of Idaho.
Second, Judge Dunn concluded that because the property
was located in Texas that Telford could not access Idaho courts to
seek relief for breaches of the sales contract. This conclusion of law
violated l.C. section 29-110.
Third, Judge Dunn argued theories of active and passive
websites; an argument never raised by opposing counsel and
therefore waived as a matter of law. C.R. 393, sub paragraph 2.
Fourth, Judge Dunn avoided commenting on the more then 9
phone calls, 2 faxes and 6 emails made by Defendants and directed
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to Telford in the state of Idaho as shown in C.R. 273, in order to
avoid the Defendant's "directed acts" against an Idaho resident.
Furthermore, while Judge Dunn mentioned that Telford
improved the property, he did not mention that the actual value of
improvements at the time of the October 3,2011 Decision was at
least $250,000.00 and that these assets, which were collateralized
by Idaho and Utah citizens, had been converted by the Defendants
- thus adding a new cause of action for constructive trust.
Finally, there was no susbstantive assessment of plaintiffs
causes of actions presented in her complaint.
Immediately after Judge Dunn issued his October 3, 2011 Decision,

the

Oneida County Prosecutor charged Telford with forgery of Clerk Diane Skidmore's notary
onto Telford's affidavit dated July 18, 2011 ~ in order to defeat the underlying civil litigation

by a fabricated fraud charge.

In fact,

what the Prosecutor had done was seize Telford's

original July 18, 2011 affidavit from Telford's abode during the illegal search on August
1O, 2011, cut off Diane Skidmore's original notary from Telford's original July 18, 2011
affidavit, drawn down another copy of Holli's draft of her July 18, 2011 Affidavit from
Holli's computers which were also seized on August 1O, 2011,
Skidmore's original notary to the

newly drawn draft copy.

and

taped Diane

The Prosecutor then

subsequently charged Telford with forging Diane Skidmore's notary to her July 18, 2011
Affidavit and with multiplicious counts of submitting this false document to various public
offices in re

Sixth Judicial District of Idaho,

Oneida County case no. 2011-CR-958,

What the prosecutor did not take into account was that Telford had a common practice of
obtaining at least three original notaries on the same document and preserving these
originals at various locations for safe keeping.

Ultimately Telford would produce another

orignally notarized July 18, 2011 Affidavit to the criminal court, which resulted in dismissal
of all criminal charges with prejudice on April 5, 2012.
In the interim however,

Telford timely moved for rule 11 reconsideration

and to take in new evidence of additional

Idaho

RICO charges of theft by

extortion in the illicit use of the Idaho criminal system to defeat Telford's civil
claims against the Defendants herein.

C.R. 315-358.

Telford argued that there was no question that the Defendants
committed injury within the 4 corners of the state of Idaho sufficient to
be held to answer for their tortious and criminal activity in the state of
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Idaho by virtue of the pending criminal prosecution. Telford sought to
supplement her complaint with these additional RICO allegations in
accordance with IRCP rule 15(b).
Telford also argued the laws relating to formation of contracts;
all of which concluded that a contract is formed in the state where: (1)
the contract is signed (here, the contract being the bid contract
constituting acceptance of Smith County's unilateral offer to sell the
property to the winning bidder); (2) where the contract is reduced to
writing and signed;
(3) consideration is provided to support the
contract; (4) the offeree accepts the terms of a unilateral offer and
performs on those terms;
(5) loan obligations are comitted to
provide consideration for the contract; and (6) communications are
directed to firm up the terms of the contract C.R. 318 - 320. In the
instant case, all of the contract formation took place in the State of
Idaho.
In addition, Telford also raised violations of l.C. 29-110 and
the Court's failure to address the tortious injury prong under the Due
Process clause of both the Idaho Long arm Statute and the Federal
Constitution which placed personal jurisdiction in the forum where
Plaintiff alleged the injuries were felt or had an effect. C.R. 317, para.
3, footnote 2. Plaintiff cited to gth circuit cases holding that personal
jurisdiction exists in the forum where plaintiff suffers pecuniary or
other personal injury from the defendant's tortious acts. C.R. 336337. Plaintiff also cited to Blimka v. MyWeb V\/holesalerLLC, 152
P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (ID 2008) where the Idaho Supreme Court
held that personal jurisdiction lied in the state of Idaho where Blimka
was induced to part with funds as a result of the Defendant's
fraud. C.R. 337, footnote 8.
As exhibit "3" attached to Telford's
rule 11 motion, Telford attached a voice recording of the selling officer
Lois Mosley in April of 2011 when Mosley had confirmed that the
property was not subject to redemption and that the sale was
conclusive and binding.
Finally, Telford sought an analysis of personal jurisdiction
under Idaho's RICO act with the last overt act being being the corrupt
and abusive initiation of criminal process against Telford in Oneida
County Idaho.
On February 29, 2012,

Judge Dunn completely avoided Telford's petition to

augment the underlying case with an abuse of process claim and additional allegations
under the Idaho RICO act.

Rather Judge Dunn's ruling was solely limited to the

purchase transaction itself and the torts present at the

time Telford purchased the

property, not after when Telford learned about the fraud, conversion and RICO violations.
Judge Dunn refused to find personal jurisdiction in the state of Idaho because the
transaction involved the purchase of real property in the State of Texas which could not be
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physically delivered to Telford in Idaho. C.R. 420, para. 1 :
"

If the real property [sic but] had been portable and Telford had "
taken possession of the property in Idaho, like the purchaser in
Blimka, then the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute may
have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the
Defendants. However, real property is not portable. Under
these circumstances the injury could only be felt in Texas.

Likewise,

Judge Dunn concluded that the Due Process clause of the US

Constitution barred personal jurisdiction over the defendants in idaho because Telford
could only possess the property in Texas.
On March 15, 2012, plaintiff filed a rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate the February
29, 2012 ruling on the grounds that the ruling had not been sent to plaintiff in order to give
plaintiff opportunity to object.

On March 21, 2012,

Judge Dunn gave plaintiff an

additional 14 days from the date of March 15, 2012 in which to file an objection to the
Feruary 29, 2012 Decision. See C.R. 433, paragraph 5.
On March 27, 2012, Telford filed an affidavit indicating the progress of the
February 14, 2012 oral proceedings before the court. In paragraphs 7-8 @C.R. 437-438,
Telford complained that she needed to amend the complaint to state "in state" RICO,
abuse of process and conversion claims against the Defendants.

Telford specifically

attested :
"

I just learned that the Defendants had stolen mine and Ferron "
Stokes manufactured home on the property, all of our
construction equipment, and our heavy duty dump trailer based on opposing counsel's proclamation to the remainder
Defendants that Oneida County was prosecuting me for 14
felony counts and that I would therefore not be able to
prosecute my claims herein due to likely incarceration in jail. "

Telford argued that the Court was required to hear Telford's new allegations
under the doctrine of Merger. In paragrap 11 @ C.R. 438 - 439, Telford further attested:
"

It is undisputed that I argued an Idaho RICO claim back in "
July of 2011 and that the new theft and extortion facts raised
at the February 14, 2012 hearing raised additional predicate
RICO acts consummated in the state of Idaho (citing fn. 5) and
showed continuous racketeering activity.

Telford cited to footnote 5 @ C.R. 439 for the law acquiring personal jurisdiction over the
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Defendants under the criminal statutes when an element of a a crime is committed within
the jurisdiction.

TELFORD urged that l.C. 19-302 served as a jurisdictional statute for

her RICO claims (C.R. 441) and that the

Court

failed to conduct any jurisdictional

analysis under her RICO causes of action. Telford cited to the affidavits of Ferron Stokes
and Mike Slicker C.R. 444 - 448 as containing party opponent admissions that the Texas
defendants had illicitly used the criminal process in the state of Idaho as a vehicle to steal
plaintiffs properties in the state of Texas as proscribed by Idaho's theft by extortion
statute.

C.R. 440.

In particular,

the Slicker affidavit presents

party opponent

admissions made by the KELLEY defendants who were served with the process herein
but never appeared to defend, C.R. 444, para. 5, to wit:
" I went over to the property with LA Greer and began asking the default "
owners what they were doing with Ms. Telford's properties. The
Defaulted Sandra Colemen and the Kelley Family informed us that they
had beat Ms. Telford in a lawsuit in Idaho, that they now owned Ms.
Telford's properties, and that Ms. Telford was going to jail for a long
time. We expressed disbelief and asked where they had removed Ms
Telford's properties. They refused to tell us.
On March 28, 2012,
additionai RICO

Judge Dunn rejected Telford's efforts to supplement

aiiegations into the case which accrued after the filing of the initiai

complaint in April of 2011 - because the Court had decided to dispose the case:
"

based on the pleadings, factually supplemented by affidavits. "

C.R. 451, paragraph 2.

The Court opined that since Telford's supplemental allegations

were not presented in the initial complaint, and could not be tried by consent given there
was no trial in the case,

the court had no duty to allow the additional allegations in by

way of amendment of the initial complaint.

In addition,

the Court re-affirmed that

Telford's RICO claims did not create personal jurisdiction in the State of Idaho because
the gravamen of the RICO charges dealt with non-portable real property (deferring to the
analysis rendered in the court's February 29, 2012 Decision.). C.R. 451- 452.
On April 5, 2012, the felony charges advanced by the defendants herein were
dismissed with prejudice.

After dismissal of the felony case,

the Oneida County

prosecutor spoiled or destroyed plaintiffs original evidence against Smith County - to
prevent Plaintiff from presenting her evidence at the time of trial in any case.
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Telford timely appealed the final rulings in the underlying

A clerk's record was created by clerk Diane Skidmore on September, 2012.

While going through the clerk's certified record, Telford noticed that the exhibits attached
to Telford's July 18, 2011 Affidavit had not been included in the clerk's record. Telford filed
a motion to augment the trial record.
2012.

Judge Dunn scheduled a hearing for October 9,

At this hearing, Judge Dunn admitted that the missing exhibits to which Telford

referred were attached to the original affidavit submitted by Telford - but set aside in the
Court's file.

Judge Dunn held that because Telford's original affidavit dated July 18, 2011

did not have a file stamp affixed to this Affidavit,
exhibits could not be included in the clerk's record.

that the Affidavit with attached 11
Judge Dunn then : (1) instructed

Telford to execute another affidavit which attached thereto the exhibits set aside in the
court's file,

but never officially filed stamped

into the record on August 1 , 2011 ; (2)

directed the clerk to file stamp Telford's affidavit providing the missing exhibits, pursuant
to rule 1O;

and (3) instructed Telford to move the Idaho Supreme Court to augment the

record with her rule 10 affidavit.

On October 10, 2012, Telford filed her rule 1O affidavit

attaching the missing exhibits.
Telford subsequently moved the Idaho Supreme Court to augment the record
with her rule 10 affidavit.

Justice Jim Jones was the assigned schedule B justice

handling all motions for the court.

Justice Jone's long time law clerk Yvonne A. Dunbar

had recently joined the defense firm representing the County defendants herein, I.e. the
law offices of ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP. Attorney ADAMS from this lawfirm lied
to the Supreme Court when he represented
missing exhibits which in fact
Decision.

that Judge Dunn never considered the

formed the basis of Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011

To add insult to injury, Attorney Adams then further denied receiving notice of

the October 10, 2012 Affidavit OR Telford's Motion to Augment the record. In response,
Telford filed a motion for contempt against opposing counsel and his clients for attempted
fraud upon the court and provided electronic copies of her emails upon opposing counsel.
Justice Jones improperly summarily denied Telford's motion to augment the record or to
find opposing counsel in contempt.

By Opposing counsel's misconduct, critical

evidentiary documents presented to the trial court are now withheld from this record.
With the foregoing case history, Telford now presents her Statement Of Facts.
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Statement Of Facts
The underlying action involves interstate internet sales of distressed properties
and landlots by Smith County Texas while acting in a private and commercial capacity.

1

In the instant case, Smith County as the owner of certain undeveloped real
property, offered to re-sell this land lot over the internet to any person of interest. Plaintiff
accepted the offer at a sum certain price based on the information provided by Smith
County over their website. The relevant mandatory procedures that must be utilized by
Smith County when selling properties owned by them are as follows:

1. The Texas Legislature has concluded that government units engaging in
contractual relations wil not be immuned from with liability or suit for breaches in their
See Texas Local Government Code § 271.151.160 et seq.
respective contracts.
which prohibits the granting of any immunity from suit to a government unit (or official)
entering into a contract. Followed in Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso,
121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003) ( •By entering into a contract, a governmental entity
necessarily waives immunity from liability under the sue and be sued clause and
voluntarily binds itself like any other party to the terms of an agreement."
The
government performs a private function when entering into a contract with another
person, and therefore no official immunity lies.). See Texas H.B. 2039 codified as Local
Government Code §§271.151.160 and providing that "by entering a contract, local
governmental entities waive their sovereign immunity to suit for breach of that contract.").
See also Paula Construction, Inc. v. City of Lytle, 220 S.W.3d 16 (Tex.App. Dist. 4
2006) (The City of Lytle "may sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded, and answer
and be answered in any matter in any court or other place." Tex. Loe. Gov't Code Ann.§
51.013 (Vernon 1999). Paula Construction argues on appeal that the City of Lytle's
immunity from suit is waived by the application of the Local Government Code. See
Tex. Loe. Gov't Code Ann.§ 271.151.160 and 271.152 (Vernon 2005) (Act of June 17,
2005, 19th Leg. R.S., ch. 604, § 1, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1549]. Section 271.152
reads: A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter
into a contract and that enters into a contract waives sovereign immunity to suit for the
purpose of adjudicating claims relative to that contract. Moreover, the statute's legislative
history indicates that, by enacting section 271.152, the Legislature intended to loosen the
immunity bar so "that all local governmental entities that have been given or are given the
statutory authority to enter into contracts shall not be immune from suits arising from
those contracts." House Comm. on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2039, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005) (emphasis added). Followed in Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. lndep.
Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivs. Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320,
327 (Tex. 2006), and The City of Houston v. Steve Williams, et al, No. 09-0770 (Tex.
03/18/2011).
In 1970, the Texas Supreme Court held that such "sue and be sued"
language granted legislative consent for lawsuits. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brownsville
Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d@813 (Tex. 1970). Local Govt Code§ 271.151.160.
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Texas Property Tax Code. Sec. 34.01. Sale Of Property.
(e) A notice of sale must substantially comply with this subsection.
The notice must include:
(1) a statement of the authority under which the sale is to be
made;
(2) the date, time, and location of the sale; and
(3) a brief description of the property to be sold.
(m) The officer making the sale shall prepare a deed to the
purchaser of real property at the sale, to any other person whom the
purchaser may specify, or to the taxing unit to which the property was bid off.
(n) The deed vests good and perfect title in the purchaser or the
purchaser's assigns to the interest owned by the defendant in the property
subject to the foreclosure, including the defendant's right to the use and
possession of the property, subject only to the defendant's right of
redemption.
(o) If a bid sufficient to pay the amount specified by Subsection {p) is
not received, the officer making the sale, with the consent of the collector who
applied for the tax warrant, may offer property seized ... to a person for less
than that amount.
(q)
A sale of property under this section to a purchaser other than a
taxing unit:
(1) extinguishes each lien securing payment of the delinquent
taxes, penalties, and interest against that property and included in the
judgment; and
Texas Tax Code§ 34.21. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION provides:
(e) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale other than property
that was used as the residence homestead of the owner when the suit or the
application for the warrant was filed, may redeem the property in the same
manner and by paying the same amounts as prescribed by Subsection (a),
(b), (c), or (d), as applicable, except that:
(1) the owner's rig ht of redemption may be exercised not later
than the 180th day following the date on which the purchaser's taxing
unit's deed is filed for record; and ... redemption fees have been paid to
the purchaser.

Pursuant to § 34.01 (e){3), Smith County listed the property as bearing situs
address 14811 FM 2661 and sought $11,320.00 as the opening bid. C.R. 32

2

.

Plaintiff Telford examined the Smith County Appraisal Districts Website to verify
other specs on the property.

2.

C.R. _

Two properties bore the situs address of 14811 FM 2661

stands for Clerk's Record@ page no. of page.
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and both of these addresses were listed as belonging to Joseph and Tammy Conflitti. A
research of one address bore a land lot with an outshed. The other property bore a
sizeable home and acreage.

Plaintiff contacted Smith County whom informed plaintiff

that the lot with the outshed was the lot up for re-sale. Aff. Telford, para. 5, C.R. 139.
After researching the foregoing property information, Plaintiff contacted Smith
County and was directed to first submit a letter of credit to prove her ability to pay for any
winning bid. Aff. Telford, para. 7, C.R. 139. Plaintiff did submit this letter of credit to the
seiiing officer Lois Mosley,

C. Supp. R 135

3

,

in conjunction with a written bid just

above the asking bid price. Lois Mosley also asked Plaintiff to pay a 1/3 cash deposit of
her bid price and to send these deposit funds in a cashiers check or wire the funds to
Smith County through Smith County's attorneys Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson,
LLP.

A deposit amount of $4,214.77 was wire transferred from Plaintiffs bank to Smith

County's lawfirm in March of 2011. C.R. 258-259.
On March 31, 2011, Kim Vogt, a relative of Elham Neilsen, appeared at the
County Assessor's office to hear the winning bidders on the offered properties.

Telford

was the only bidder on the subject property and was declared as the new owner.
Aff. Neilsen, para.8,C.R.128; Aff. Vogt, para.4, C.R.134-135; Aff. Telford,para. 11, CR 140

3.
The 9th Circuit and Idaho both hold unilateral contracts subject to
enforcement. In Evanston Insurance Company, supra.the 9th circuit held that "A
unilateral contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for the
other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes acceptance and
execution of the contract."
Here, the fax from Bellevue Master to Northwest on
February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would be able to continue working as a
subcontractor at the construction project provided it complied with Bellevue Master's
insurance requirements. When Northwest contacted its insurance
broker and
requested that the broker issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest
accepted the unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and
Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will be formed
subject to enforcement."
and executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of an offer in Shore v.
Peterson, 204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009) ("where the offeror makes a
promise that is conditional on the offeree"s acceptance, an offeree accepts by
rendition of the requested performance."). Also see CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21
at 52 (1963) (An offer for a unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of
the
requested performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc.,
107 Idaho 286, 291, 688 P2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 1984).
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On April 4, 2011, various Smith County Assessor employees including the
selling officer Lois Mosley,

called Telford at her place of residence in Idaho no less then

three times to inform TELFORD that she had won the bid on the property and seeking to
exercise the letter of credit. The phone calls were conferenced by TELFORD to third
persons having an interest in improving the property.

These calls were also preserved

on Telford's magic jack phone and a digital photograph was made of these phone calls.
Aff. Telford, para. 9, C.R. 141, Exhibit 3, C.R. 149;

Neilsen, para. 9, C.R. 128; and Aff.

Greer, para. 7, C.R. 132.
During the phone call with the selling officer Lois Mosley, Ms. Mosley inquired
of Telford on how to exercise Telford's letter of credit for the balance of the purchase price.
TELFORD

instructed Lois that she would need to sign a sealed letter which :

(1)

announced Telford as the winning bidder; (2) indicated that the sale was conclusive and
binding; (3) informed the bank that Smith County was exercising the letter of credit, and;
(4)

announced that Telford could now possess the property and make improvements

thereto. Aff. Telford, para(s) 9 and 11, C.R. 141.
Before executing the foregoing letter,

both Lois Mosley and Appellant Holli

Telford checked the deeding history to this undeveloped lot - in order to calculate the
redemption period set forth in § 34.01(n) and § 34.21(e)(1)

and to make sure that the

prior defaulted owners could not redeem the subject real property.
This research revealed that two dates were listed for filing the Deed for
record as indicated in § 34.21 (e )(1) supra and both dates by passed the 180 day period:
First : On August 10, 2010, Smith County foreclosed on the
subject real property (formerly owned by the Estate of Paul Kelley Sr.
with Sandra Coleman as administrator) as Smith County Texas civil
On or about September 10, 2010, Smith
cause no. 22,107-C.
County was given a deed in their favor which Smith County filed of
record in Smith County Texas civil cause no. 22, 107-C.
Second: On November 2, 2010, Smith County attempted to
sell the property - but no one submitted a bid and the propety was
struck off back to Smith County. When this sale failed, Smith County
recorded it's Deed dated October 12, 201 O with the Smith County
Appraisal District.
In addition, a third statute came into play. Specifically :
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Texas Tax Code § 34.23(b) provides: "the owner of property sold
for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the
taxing unit after the property has been resold."
Also, Texas Tax Code § 34.06(d) enhances Texas Tax Code § 34.23(b) in that
it provides the following resale restrictons:
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is
conclusive and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer
making the sale shall prepare a deed to the purchaser. The
County Clerk shall file and record each deed under this
subsection and after recording shall return the deed to the
grantee.
These laws were cited by Telford without contest by the Smith County Defendants while
the case pended before the trial court. Aff. Telford, para. 10, C.R. 140.
On April 5, 2011, both Telford and the selling officer Lois Mosley concurred
that no redemption rights existed for the defaulted owners, and hence, Lois Mosley
would be executing the requested letter and directing Smith County's attorneys to approve
Mosley's executed Deed and deliver same to Telford.

On April 5, 2010,

a legal

secretary from the law offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson sent Telford an
email indicating that they were mailing to Telford's Idaho address,

the original deed to

the Smith County property along with a letter confirming purchase of this property so that
Telford could present this letter as a bill of sale to an insurance carrier for purposes of
insurance.

This email communication was attached as exhibit "4" to Telford's July 18,

2011 Affidavit as indicated in paragraph 1O of Telford's Affidavit, C.R. 141.

This email

however has been removed from the court's file and Justice Jim Jones refused to
supplement this email into the court record subject to Telford's motion to augment
the Supreme Court record.
On April 8, 2011,

Lois Mosely did execute an official letter representing to

Telford's bank that : (1) Telford was the winning bidder ;

(2) the sale was conclusive

and binding ; (3) Telford could now possess and occupy the property, (4) Telford could
make improvements to the property;

(5)

the defaulted owners passed the 180

redemption period and therefore could not redeem the property, and (6) since the
property had been resold to Telford, the prior owners could not redeem the property
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See C.R. 141 @ paragraph 11 which refers to

this letter being attached as exhibit "5" to the July 18, 2011 Affidavit of Telford.

This

been removed from the court's file and Justice Jim Jones

letter however has

refused to supplement this letter into the court record subject to Telford's motion to
augment the Supreme Court record.

Also see Aff. Neilsen, para. 9, C.R. 128 for

reference to this letter.
Shortly after the purchase was finalized and several months after Smith County
had negotiated Telford's purchase fees on the property,

Telford !earned that the property

offered by Smith County as previously owned by the Conflittis - was not the property sold
to Telford by Smith County ; that Smith County had errored on the auction listing.
C.R. 141-142.

The Smith county property actually sold to Plaintiff in fact bore

no physical address because it had never been designated as a residence address
for the prior owner.

The true property was in serious disrepair, had foliage and shrub

trees overgrown on the property and had a brick shack which had been badly burned in a
fire years before.
Telford, Neilsen, Greer, and Vogt, subsequently appeared at the assessor's
office and notified the auction officer Lois Mosley of the true condition of the distressed
property. Holli presented Lois Mosley with the auction listing which bore the incorrect
address and the Smith County abstract on the distressed property which bore no address.
Finally Telford presented Lois Mosley with Texas Property Tax Code section 34.05(d)
which mandated an accurate description on the property being sold. Lois Mosley
instructed Telford to tender a modified bid for the property she purchased - at the value
of the property only.

Smith County Appraisal District reflected the value of the land at

$4200. Telford did resubmit a modified bid at $4,200.
exhibit "3" attached to complaint.

4

C.R. 24, para.6, and C.R. 34,

The Court's October 3, 2011 Memorandum decision

reflects that Smith County instructed Telford to submit a modified bid at the value of the
property - by the following findings of fact found in the October 3, 2011 Decision. C.R.304:
Plaintiff discovered there was an error in the address on the
4.
Because Holli had already submitted a deposit of $4,214.77, she had
overpaid the sum of $14.77 which Holli expected to be advanced towards future property
taxes if Holli won the bid. C.R. 258 - 259.
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property list posted on the website. After Plaintiff advised Smith
County of the error she was directed to the property that Smith
County actually owned and that she had purchased. The parcel
Plaintiff purchased was significantly different than anticipated.
Because of this error, the Smith County Tax Assessor's Office
allowed Plaintiff to adjust her bid to reflect the value of the
correct property. Plaintiff changed her bid to reflect the value of
the true property and began to improve the property to suit her
intended purposes.
The actual property resold by Smith County to Telford was formerly owned by
Paul W. Kelley Sr. who died in 1999.

Defendant Sandra Coleman became the

administrator of his estate. The Property was never claimed or utilized as a residence
homestead within the required meaning of Texas Tax Code§ 11.13.

5

In addition, at the

time of the judgment selling the property back to Smith County entered on September 10,
2010 in Smith County case no. 22,107C, the owner Paul Kelly Sr. had been dead for 11
years and the property wasn't occupied, but rather was abandoned. The administrator of
the estate, Defendant Coleman, had not paid the property taxes on this property since
2007.

The actual tax debt at the time of the re-sale to plaintiff was $4100.

The

"residence homestead" status was relevant to the inquiry of when the redemption period
on the property began and terminated.

According to the Texas redemption statute, this

"abandoned property" had to have been used as a residence homestead at the time
cause no. 22, 107C had been commenced in August of 2010. Since the property was not
a residence homestead in August of 2010, the defaulted owners on the property had 180
days following the taxing unit's recordation of their deed in cause no. 22, 107C on
September 10, 2010 in which to pay the redemption fees,

redemption costs plus the

redemption premium of 25% to Plaintiff - as the purchaser at the resale auction.

6

Texas Tax Code § 11 .13 provides as follows:
(1) "Residence homestead" means a structure ... secured and occupied ..
that: (A) is owned by one or more individuals, (8) is ... adapted for human residence; (C)
is used as a residence; and (D) is occupied as his principal residence by an owner
6.
Texas Tax Code§ 34.21. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION reads as follows:
(e) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale other than property that
was used as the residence homestead of the owner when the suit or the application for
the warrant was filed, may redeem the property in the same manner and by paying the
same amounts as prescribed by Subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d), as applicable, except that:
5.
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Telford purchased the property at a re-sale auction given the

property was not sold at the first auction conducted on November 2, 2010. Pursuant to
Texas Tax Code

§ 34.23(b) : "an owner may not redeem property that has been

resold by a taxing unit."

Therefore,

the re-sale to Telford protected Telford against

the redemption rights of the prior owner as a matter of law.
In accordance with Texas Property Tax Code § 34.05(e), the selling officer Lois
Mosley had a duty to turn over the deed on the property to Telford

7

,

re-sale which cut off the right to redemption pursuant to § 34.23(b).

especially after the
According to the

email sent to Telford on April 5, 2011 by Smith County's attorneys [and now gutted from
the record by clerk Diane Skidmoreas stated supra],

the lawfirm had indicated that they

mailed the Deed to Telford at her Idaho address.

Furthermore under the doctrine of

partial performance, the resale was binding and could not be revoked.
Telford made substantial improvements to the property once the selling officer
confirmed to Telford that the sale was conclusive and binding and that Telford could now

the owner's right of redemption may be exercised not later than
the 180th day following the date on which the purchaser's or
taxing unit's deed is filed for record; and ... redemption fees have
been paid to the purchaser.
(2) Redemption "Costs" include:
(A) the amount reasonably spent by the purchaser maintaining,
preserving, and safekeeping the property, including the cost
of:
(i) property insurance;
(ii) repairs or improvements required ... by a lease of the
property;
(B) Redemption premiums of 25% first year, 50% second year..
7.
Texas Property Tax Code§ 34.05: RESALE BY TAXING UNIT, provides in
material parts as follows:
(d) . .. The acceptance of a bid by the officer conducting the sale is
conclusive and binding on the question of its sufficiency.
(1)

(e)

The presiding officer of a taxing unit selling real property
... shall execute a deed to the property conveying to the
purchaser the right, title, and interest acquired or held by each
taxing unit that was a party to the judgment foreclosing tax
liens on the property. The conveyance shall be made subject to

any remaining right of redemption at the time of the sale.
For non-residential property, the redemption right expires 180 days after the Deed is first
fifed of record. The Deed was filed in Cause no. 22, 107C on September 10, 2010.
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improve the property and make it into a residential structure. Telford, Stokes and other
investment partners improved the property to the tune of $250,000 by excavating the
property, by developing the infrastructure to situate and affix a double wide manufactured
home and by moving too and affixing a double-wide manufactured home permanently to
the property.

During the foregoing development proqess, Telford also consummated a

residential lease with affiant Kim Vogt to cover the debt created by the improvements .

.A.fter the foregoing substantial improvements had been made, and while
Telford and others were on the property finishing up the improvements, on June 1, 2011
Paul Kelly Jr and Paul Kelly Senior's ex wife appeared at the property to inquire into it's
disposition.

Telford informed the Kelleys in front of everyone that Telford had purchased

the property from Smith County back in March of 2011

and that the property was not

subject to redemption based on the passing of the 180 day redemption period and re-sale
of the property to Telford.
The Kelleys subsequently left the property and appeared at that the Assessor's
office to inquire into how they could void the sale and be unjustly enriched by the over
$250,000 improvements made to the property. The Kelleys promised to pay the County
more than three times the sales price paid by TELFORD if the county would revoke the
sale.

The sales officer Lois Mosley informed the Kelleys that Mosley

had not yet

delivered the deed to Telford and that failure to deliver the deed could possibly void the
sale. Mosley also indicated that there was a problem with the redemption period because
the property was not a residential property.

8

The Kelleys informed

Mosley that the

property now had a residence on it due to TELFORD's improvements. Mosley instructed
the Kelleys to return to the property and take pictures of the residence and the Smith
County Assessor's office would extend the redemption period to 2 years as residential

8.
Under Texas law to claim a residential property exemption : Texas Tax
Code § 34.21 (e) requires : the real property sold at a tax sale must have been "used
as the residence homestead of the owner when the suit or the application for the
Here, the suit for forclosure on tax liens against the Kelley estate
warrant was filed."
was filed in June of 2010. At that time, there was no residence on the property.
Therefore the Kelleys could not claim the 2 year redemption period as a matter of law.
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The Kellys did return to the property and take pictures of the home while

plaintiffs lessee occupied the home. C.R. 137, para. 11. The selling officer never turned
the deed over to Telford as required under Texas Tax Code § 34.0S(d); thus effectively
obtstructing the conveyance. C.R. C.R. 27, para. 19.
After numerous

demands to turn over the Deed,

on June 3, 2011,

TELFORD sued Smith County, the Assessor-Collector and a conspiring

lawfirm for :

(1) specific performance demanding turn over of the Deed; (2) Breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, (3) Violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and (4)
for RICO violations based on RICO acts of false promises and theft by conversion of the
Ded promised to TELFORD. C.R. 29, para. 25.
All defendant parties were immediately served under Idaho's Consumer
Protection Acts long arm service statute.

l.C. 48-613(2).

County Judge Joel Baker

received service of process for Smith county as their statutory agent. C.R. 103-104.
Attorney Tab Beall and his lawfirm made a special appearance and moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs complaint against them based on the claim that the state of Idaho had
no general jurisdiction over them because they did not have property in Idaho nor did they
do business in the State of Idaho. C. Supp. R. 87-89.
Smith County and the Assessor - Collector separately moved to dismiss the
suit because they were a govermental entity residing in Texas and did not exercise any
governmental functions in the state of Idaho. C. Supp.R. 117-118.

Consequently they

too claimed lack of general personal jurisdiction over them.
The Kelley - Coleman defendants did not make any appearances.
Telford

responded to the Smith County Defendant's motion to dismiss by

asserting that Smith County's status as a governmental entity was not recognized under
Texas law because the county was engaging in contracting acts with private parties for
goods and services.

Accordingly, Telford argued that Smith County was liable for their

actions as any other private party would be citing the authority set forth in footnote 1
supra at page 11 .

Telford further argued that the State of Idaho had specific personal

jurisdiction over the County defendants because their illegal acts were knowingly directed
at an Idaho resident.
Telford also argued that Beall and his lawfirm were aiding and abetting false
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promise, theft by conversion and theft by extortion and therefore were equally liable as
the principal for advancing the goals of a civil or criminal conspiracy. Telford asserted
that the state of Idaho had specific not general jurisdiction over Beall and his lawfirm in
the State of Idaho. C.R. 264-289. C.R. 315-339.
More than 6 weeks after all the defendants in the suit had been served with
process and therefore knew the value of the properties they had stolen by failure to
deliver the deed to TELFORD,

on July 11, 2011, the Kelleys appeared before the

Smith County Tax Collector Gary Barber to illegally redeem the property.

Gary Barber

had been served and had responded to the Idaho lawsuit as above shown, and therefore
knew that the Kelleys did not have any redemption rights available to them.
Nevertheless,

Gary Barber invalidly received significantly insufficient redemption fees in

the amount of $12,608.36 from the Kelleys (under a 2 year redemption theory premised
upon a residential property) and without the required affidavit indicating that the Kelleys
could not locate TELFORD to settle the amount of redemption fees due TELFORD as the
purchaser, as required under Texas law.

See Texas Tax Code § 34.21 (f) provides that

the owner of the real property must make an affidavit that the owner has made diligent
search in the county in which the property is located for the purchaser at the tax sale and
has failed to find the purchaser,

... before the defaulted owner may contact the

assessor-collector to pay any redemption fees.

Here, the Kelleys knew at all times

where they could contact Plaintiff because they had been served with and received notice
of the Idaho lawsuit. See C.R. 43-143.

Hence if redemption were available, which it

was not, the Kelleys redemption was still invalid for failure to tender a valid affidavit
explaining their attempts to redeem the property from plaintiff as the purchaser thereto.
Moreover, the redemption fees would have cost no less than $250,000; the amount of
monies Telford and others spent to improve the property on behalf of the leasehold
contract, plus a 25% redemption fee.
Nevertheless,

after Gary Barber illegally accepted these fees,

Defendant

Barber turned the matter of preparing the Deed over to the lawfirm of Purdue, Brandon,
Felter & Mott;

the same lawfirm named as a defendant and specially appearing in this

underlying Idaho lawsuit, and whom TELFORD charged with conspiracy to commit theft
by false promise in failing to deliver the DEED

to TELFORD and with

theft

by
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conversion by nullifying TELFORD's entitlement to the DEED.
This defendant lawfirm and specifically Attorney Tab Beall, also named and
served as a defendant herein, constructed and authored a void Redemption Deed which
purported to convey the subject real property to Paul Kelly Jr.,

knowing that a

constructive trust had been effectively placed on the property by virtue of the massive
improvements made to the property before conveyance of the void redemption Deed
AND knowing that he was aiding and abetting theft crimes against TELFORD and other
Idaho investors.

Tab Beall then tendered this void Redemption Deed to County Judge

Joel Baker for execution.

County Judge Joel Baker was the statutory agent served with

Smith Courty's lawsuit (C.R. 103-104) and therefore had personal knowledge that the
Redemption Deed he executed on July 11, 2011 was illegal, void & against public policy.
TELFORD presented this void Redemption to the trial court pre-decision
entered on October 3, 2011.

Judge Dunn in his October 3, 2011 decision even referred

to this redemption deed in his findings of fact, C.R. 304, para. 2 to wit:
After Plaintiff incurred substantial costs improving the land,
Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed
the Property and that the Smith County Tax Assessors
Office was revoking the saie.

"

The Court record now shows an absence of this Redemption Deed from the
record which Plaintiff contends was gutted from the court's record.

9

9. During a rule 10 proceeding conducted by Judge Dunn on October 9, 2012,
Judge Dunn admitted that the court file contained an original July 18, 2011 Affidavit with
11 attached exhibits by TELFORD - but because the clerk failed to affix a file stamp to
this original record, the Court was not going to include TELFORD original affidavit into the
clerk's record on appeal. The Court disregarded Plaintiffs claim that she fax served
Judge Dunn with a copy of her original affidavit with all attached exhibits to his chambers
on August 1, 2011 as required under rule 7, and that Judge Dunn must have considered
his chambers copy because Judge Dunn made no mention of missing exhibits from
Plaintiffs July 18, 2011 Affidavit in his October 3, 2011 Decision, which fact findings were
almost entirely predicated on TELFORD's July 18, 2011 Affidavit. See C.R. 303-304.
Judge Dunn refused to perform his duties under rule 10 and correct the record. Instead
he referred TELFORD to the Idaho Supreme Court for a motion to supplement the record.
Justice Jim Jones long time law clerk just joined the lawfirm representing the courty
defendants herein and biasly and wrongfully refused to augment these missing records
into this appeal, and which formed the basis of the trial court's rulings.
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Immediately after TELFORD presented her inculptory evidence against the
defendants as attached to her July 18, 2011 Affidavit (see C.R. 138-145 which refers to
11 exhibits in the body of her affidavit but only three exhibits were included in the clerk's
record ),

the Appellee's attorneys herein colluded with the Oneida County Prosecutor to

conduct an illegal search and seizure on Plaintiff's home for the purpose of seizing and
destroying all of Plaintiff's electronic and paper evidence against the Defendants
/Appellees herein.
prosecutor,

On August 10, 2011, Oneida county executive officials led by the

searched and seized every electrnnic device, electronic record and paper

record located in TELFORD's home - based on a general search warrant which failed to
identify any crime committed by TELFORD.
TELFORD immediately complained to Judge Dunn about the seizure of the trial
records and evidence and asked for a contiuance of the proceedings.

C.R. 192-260.

Opposing counsel objected to the continuance. As part of her application to continue,
TELFORD provided a copy of her mandamus petition submitted to the criminal court
demanding return of all her illegally seized civil case files and records, among other
properties. C.R. 220-247.

Judge Dunn did continue the summary judgment proceedings

for a limited period of time. Judge Dunn subsequently made his decision on October 3,
2011 based on the filings made pre-seizure of TELFORD's property on August 10, 2011.
Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011 Decision was limited to the issue of personal
jurisdiction under a contracts theory. The Decision mis-represented several facts material
to Judge Dunn's contracts analysis and accordingly caused a misapplication of the law.
For example, Judge Dunn found that TELFORD traveled to Texas and executed her bid
contract in Texas.

In fact,

there were absoluely no facts in the record to support this

finding or conclusion of law. TELFORD never traveled to Texas for purposes of bidding
on the property in question. The record showed that unilateral contract was initiated over
the internet by Smith County reaching into the state of Idaho to advertise property for
sale in Texas. C.R. 343, para.6.
in writing :

The bid /purchase contract that TELFORD commited

(1) was signed and executed in Malad Idaho (C.R. 343, para. 7) ; (2) was

supported by money and loan considerations generating from Idaho lenders (see C.R.
343, para. 7; C.R. 446--447) ;
Idaho (C.R. 343, para. 7),

(3)

and ; (4)

obligated TELFORD to commitments in the state of
the negotiations were the product of more than 9
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phone calls, 2 faxes and 6 emails sent into the state of Idaho by the Defendants during
the negotiations process. C.R. 273. para. 3.
Based on Judge Dunn's erroneous findings,
contract at issue was formed in Texas.
findings,

Judge Dunn concluded the that

After correcting Judge Dunn's clearly erroneous

TELFORD set forth the relevant laws establishing the loci for the "formation of

contracts" in C.R. Pages 318- 321, and which all affirmed that Idaho was the loci where
the bid acceptance contract was formed.
TELFORD also objected to the lack of any analysis under Idaho's tortious
injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute and any jurisdictional analysis for contacts with
the state of Idaho when the elements of any crimes are committed within the state. C.R.
333-336.
On February 29, 2012, Judge Dunn issued a Decision opining personal
jurisdiction under the tortious injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute and the Due
Process Clause. Judge Dunn refused to find personal jurisdiction in the state of Idaho
because the transaction involved the purchase of real property in the State of Texas which
could not be physically delivered to Telford in Idaho. C.R. 420, para. 1 :
"

If the real property [sic but] had been portable and Telford had "
taken possession of the property in Idaho, like the purchaser in
Blimka, then the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute may
have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the
Defendants. However, real property is not portable. Under
these circumstances the injury could only be felt in Texas.

Likewise,

Judge Dunn concluded that the Due Process clause of the US

Constitution barred personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Idaho because Telford
could only possess the property in Texas.
Plaintiff objected to the courts order because Plaintiff was not seeking
delivery of the non-portable real property to Idaho; rather Plaintiff was seeking delivery of
the "portable DEED" to her in the state of Idaho. Plaintiff argued that failure to deliver that
DEED created a constructive trust on the Texas property which the Idaho courts could
decide pursuant to Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d, 1355, 106 Idaho 455 (ID, 1984) C.R. 394 ,
C.R.395footnote4,

and

l.C.

Section29-110.

10

In addition plaintiff cited to

various portable properties belonging to Idaho citizens and which were also located on
the Texas property - to included heavy duty construction equipment and dump trailers.
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Plaintiff urged that these "portable" properties did not align with the Court's due process
analysis.

Finally, plaintiff complained about the lack of any jurisdictional analysis under

her RICO claims.
Remarkably,

shortly after Plaintiff identified her portable properties,

the

Defendants removed and concealed Plaintiff's portable properties from the Texas
property to avoid liablity for these claims.
On March 27, 2012, Telford filed an affidavit complaining about the recent
theft of her portable piOperties and needing to amend hei complaint to include RICO
claims relative to using the criminal process in the state of Idaho to extort TELFORD of
her civil claims in the underlying litigation. C.R. 437·438, para(s) 7-8. Telford specifically
attested :
"

I just learned that the Defendants had stolen mine and Ferron "
Stokes manufactured home on the property, all of our
construction equipment, and our heavy duty dump trailer based on opposing counsel's proclamation to the remainder
Defendants that Oneida County was prosecuting me for 14
felony counts and that I would therefore not be able to
prosecute my claims herein due to likely incarceration in jail. "

Telford argued that the Court was required to hear Telford's RICO allegations
under the criminal statute providing for jurisdiction in the state of Idaho when an element
of a crime is committed within this jurisdiction.

See l.C. 19-302. C.R. 441. Telford

complained that the Court failed to conduct any jurisdictional analysis under her RICO
causes of action. Telford cited to the affidavits of Ferron Stokes and Mike Slicker C.R.
444 - 448 as containing party opponent admissions that the Texas defendants had illicitly
used the criminal process in the state of Idaho as a vehicle to steal plaintiff's properties in
the state of Texas as proscribed by Idaho's theft by extortion statute. C.R. 440.
particular,

the Slicker affidavit presented

In

party opponent admissions made by the

KELLEY defendants (who were served with the process herein but never appeared to
defend). See C.R. 444, para. 5, to wit:
" I went over to the property with LA Greer and began asking the default "
owners what they were doing with Ms. Telford's properties. The
Defaulted Owners Sandra Colemen and the Kelley Family informed us
that they had beat Ms. Telford in a lawsuit in Idaho, that they now owned
Ms. Telford's properties, and that Ms. Telford was going to jail for a
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long time. We expressed disbelief and asked where they had removed Ms
Telford's properties. They refused to tell us.
Sustaining the doctrine of Merger. In paragraph 11 @ C.R. 438 - 439, Telford further
attested:
"

It is undisputed that I argued an Idaho RICO claim back in "
July of 2011 and that the new theft and extortion facts raised
at the February 14, 2012 hearing raised additional predicate
RICO acts consummated in the state of Idaho (citing fn. 5) and
showed continuous racketeering activity.

C.R. 439, para. 5.
On March 28, 2012, out of a measure of precaution,
addressed

the Court summarily

TELFORD's jurisdictional claims under the RICO statute by adopting his

analysis tendered under the tortious injury prong which held that because the real
proeprty in Texas was not portable to the state of Idaho, Idaho could not obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. C.R. 451- 452.
COMES NOW,

plaintiff and presents her Statement of Issues presenting both

first impression and common questions:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
\Nhether substituted service of a summons and complaint by certified
mail upon the out of state parties in the underlying case under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act's Long Arm service statute, l.C. 48-613, constituted valid service of
Process on these defendants so served and commanded the entry of a defaults and
default judgments as to these Defendants who failed to appear and defend.

2.
\Mlether the commission of an illegal act as proscribed under Idaho's
Consumer Practices Act section 48-603 by the out of state seller herein against
TELFORD, a resident of the state of Idaho, automatically granted personal jurisdiction
over the seller.

3.
\/\lhether TELFORD"S bid contract was formed in the state of Idaho
sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over all parties to that contract : when TELFORD
signed the bid contract in Malad Idaho, TELFORD committed herself to loans and other
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financial obligations with Idaho lenders to provide consideration for the bid contract; and
TELFORD collateralized Idaho personal and real properties to provide securities for the
loans serving as consideration for the contract.

4.
Whether equity claims of specific performance and constructive trust may
be heard in Idaho courts when pertaining to real estate located outside the state of Idaho
- when the fraud or deception practiced by the tortfeasor specifically caused to the
equitable claims to arise to the injury of an Idaho resident, here TELFORD.

5.
Whether l.C. 19-302 may be used as a jurisdictional statute to invoke
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who commit in whole or in part any
element of a racketeering predicate act within the state of Idaho.

6.
\Mlether the specially appearing defendants actually made a general
appearance in the underlying action because they failed to limit their initial motion to an
attack on personal jurisdiction only.

7.
\Mlether the trial court errored as a matter of law when he entered a
final judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims against the specially appearing defendants
with prejudice on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, in violation of IRCP rule
41(b).

8.
\Mlether the trial court errored in not allowing TELFORD to amend her
complaint in accordance with the evidence presented before the conclusion of the case.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Jurisdiction is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. State v. Barros, 131
Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).
A question of law is reviewed de nono. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82,
84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009)

Jurisdiction for Appeal
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuan to l.C. 13-201 and l.A.R.
11 (7) as final judgments have been rendered in the case.
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Issue No.1
Whether substituted service of a summons and complaint by certified mail.
upon the out of state parties in the underlying case under the Idaho Consumer
l.C. 48-613, constituted valid service of
Protection Act's Long Arm service statute.
Process on these defendants so served and commanded the entry of a defaults and
default judgments as to these Defendants who failed to appear and defend.

Plaintiffs complaint sought as one of it's primary claims, a statutory cause of
action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, This act provides a specific long arm
service statute under l.C. 48-613 as set out below :
l.C. 48-613. Service of notice. Service of any notice, demand or subpoena
under this act shall be made personally within this state,
but if such
cannot be obtained, substituted service therefor may be made in the
following manner:
(1)
Personal service thereof without this state; or
(2) The mailing thereof by registered or certified mail to the last known
place of business, residence or abode within or without this state
of such person for whom the same is intended; or
(3)
As to any person other than a natural person, in the manner
provided in the Idaho rules of civil procedure as if a complaint
which institutes a civil proceeding had been filed.

For every Defendant that plaintiff sued under this cause of action,
exercised the substituted service provision under this statute

Plaintiff

because the Defendant

could not be served with Notice of the lawsuit personally within this state - as each
Defendant resided at an abode without the state.

Accordingly,

as admitted in each

default certificate and return of Summons, each Defendant was served by certified mail
to the last known place of residence or abode without this state. The original certified
receipts were timely filed with the court and attached to their respective returns of
Summons. C.R. 43-121.
When the served Defendant did not appear, Plaintiff filed a Request for Clerk's
entry of Default and Default judgment pursuant to IRCP rules 55(a) and (b)(1) and an
Affidavit in support thereof, as to each non-appearing Defendant. C.R. 43-121.
On July 18, 2011,

Judge Dunn entered a Decision denying the entry of

defaults and default judgments as to each non-appearing Defendant. C.R. 122-124. The
basis for denying the defaults/judgments was because Plaintiff had served each
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Defendant by certified mail pursuant to l.C. 48-613 (2) supra, and not personally as required
under IRCP rule 55(b)(1). The court also noted that the long arm service statute did not provide
for service of a summons.
TELFORD objected arguing that the long arm service statute provided for the
service of NOTICE or SUBPEONA, both of which are alternative forms of a Summons.
Telford also claimed that the form

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

printed on the Idaho Supreme Court's website provided the following language to enter
the default of a civil defendant :
Plaintiff moves this Court for Entry of Default on the grounds that Defendant,
having (a) received notice (emphasis added) by personal service; or (b)
been served by publication, has failed to appear INithin the time period for
answering the Complaint in the above-entitled matter. This motion is made
pursuant to Rule 55(a)(1) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the pleadings
filed herein.
The word Summons in nowhere in the form default document.

Moreover,

TELFORD cited the rule that the more specific statute controls over the more general
statute, here rule 4. See Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 313, 208 P.3d
289, 295 (2009) . Also TELFORD indicated that Judge Brown, a co ordinate court to
Judge Dunn, found service by certified mail acceptable in CPA cases.
Nevertheless, there exists a conflict in the CPA long arm service statute and
IRCP Rule 55(b)(1) because the latter statute provides that a default may only be taken
against a defendant

that defendant is personally served or served by publication.

Plaintiff asks that this Court resolve the conflict in these two rules in Plaintiffs favor and
entere the defaults and default judgments of each non-appearing Defendant.

issue No.2
Whether the commission of an illegal act as proscribed under Idaho's Consumer
Practices Act section 48-603 by the out of state seller against TELFORD. a resident
of the state of Idaho. automatically granted personal jurisdiction over the seller.

Plaintiff could only find one case on point with foregoing service made under
the state's ralted CPA statute, to wit:

State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n 81 Wn.2d 259, 501P.2d290
(1972) Here, Reader's Digest, was sending unsolicited sweepstakes
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solicitations through the mail to Washington residents at a time when
sweepstakes were prohibited by Washington law.
Reader's Digest challenged the superior court's personal
jurisdiction. On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the superior
court's dismissal, holding that "performance of an unfair trade
practice in this state by a foreign corporation which has no
agents, employees, offices or other property in the state, is a
sufficient contact to establish jurisdiction" under the CPA's longarm statute. Id. at 276. The court also held that recognizing personal
jurisdiction under the CPA "does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, because the offender "solicit[s] Washington
business .... by methods proscribed under the act. Id. at 278.
Under such circumstances, it "is the duty of the state to protect
its residents from such unfair practices. If our courts are not open,
the state wm be without a remedy and the Consumer Protection
Act will be rendered useless.
In the instant case,

plaintiff alleged the following unfair trade practices

committed by the Defendants.'
l.C. 48-603. Unfair methods and practices.
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared to be unlawful, where a person knows, or in the exercise of
due care shouid know, that he has in the past, or is:
(4)
Using deceptive representations or designations of
geographic origin in connection with goods or services;
(5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship,
approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that
they do not have
(9) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell
them as advertised;
(17) Engaging in any act or practice which is otherwise
misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer.
Furthermore in White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 140 Idaho 882 (Idaho 2004), this
court held that real estates transactions were

covered under the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act.
In the case at bar,

the record shows that the defendant's used deceptive

designations of geographic origin in connection with the original sale of property to
TELFORD - leading TELFORD to believe she had purchased the Conflittis property
which had qualities which were completely lacking in the real property sold to TELFORD.
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While this deception may have been cured by allowing TELFORD to modify her bid to
reflect the actual value of the land sold to TELFORD, the defendants subsequent actions
evidenced further violations of the Act in that these defendants advertised conveyance
services to plaintiff repeatedly and adnausium with intent not to sell these services as
advertised.

Moreover, the defendants continued to lull TELFORD into believing they

would perform the required conveyance,

in order to procure TELFORD to substantively

improve the property so that the county could later collect additional claimed redemption

fees

three times greater than the previous purchase fees pad by TELFORD in the

amount of $4,217.00, and which said fees were never returned to TELFORD. Finally,
there is no question that the Defendants actions as a whole both before, during and at the
conclusion of the CPA litigation, were misleading, false and deceptive to TELFORD , an
Idaho consumer.
Idaho following the teachings of the Montana and Oregon Supreme Courts
has held that where a specific statute provides a resident with contractual remedies
before the Idaho Courts,

restricting those contractual remedies violates public policy.

See Cerami-Kate v. Energywave Corporation, 773 P.2d 1143; 116 Idaho 56 (ID, 1989), a
Consumer Protection Act case wherein Plaintiffs sued for violations under the Act and
Energywave filed a motion to dismiss based upon contractual language which selected
the law of Florida as the law to be applied to the contract and which designated a
particular county court in Florida as the venue for the enforcement, construction, or
interpretation of the contract.
that purported to restrict
subject to the CPA,

The Supreme Court struck down any contract provision

an Idaho citizen from enforcing any right

under a contract

in Idaho tribunals, as void against public policy set forth in the CPA

and LC. 29-110. Following State ex rel Polaris Industries v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471
(Mont.1985), and Rose v. Etling, 255 Or. 395, 467 P.2d 633 (1970), also CPA cases
wherein the courts ruled that a specific statute providing for protection of the usual
remedies granted to the buyer by statute could not be restricted by a venue selection
clause which voided venue in the ldahocourts.)
TELFORD asserts that since the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is a specific
statute providing remedies to consumers of the state of Idaho for illegal and unethical
practices of sellers,

that this statute on it's face provided for personal jurisdiction over
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each and every defendant alleged to have engaged in a deceptive consumer practice
against TELFORD.

Issue No. 3
Whether TELFORD"S bid contract was formed in the state of Idaho sufficient
to invoke personal jurisdiction over all parties to that contract : when TELFORD signed
the bid contract in Malad Idaho. TELFORD committed herself to loans and other_
financial obligations with Idaho lenders to provide consideration for the bid contract: and
TELFORD collatera!ized Idaho personal and real properties to provide securities for the
loans serving as consideration for the contract.

During the underlying proceedings,

Plaintiff strenuously objected to the

courts finding that the bid contract that TELFORD executed was formed in the State of
Texas.

Citing again to the record, the bid /purchase contract that TELFORD commited

in writing :

(1) was signed and executed in Malad Idaho (C.R. 343, para. 7) ; (2) was

supported by money and loan considerations generating from Idaho lenders (see C.R.
343, para. 7; C.R. 446-447) ; (3)

obligated TELFORD to financial commitments in the

state of Idaho and collaterized TELFORD's Idaho properties (C.R. 343, para. 7),

(4)

and ;

the negotiations 1iveie the prnduct of more than 9 phone cails, 2 faxes and 6 emails

sent into the state of Idaho by the Defendants during the negotiations process. C.R. 273.
para. 3.
TELFORD provided the following laws to prove that her bid contract was
formed in Idaho and therefore required adjudication in an Idaho court (C.R. 317-321):
(1)

Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, a contract is considered
consummated, formed and executed where the contract is signed.
See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (91h Cir. 1967) (This circuit adopts
the rule of lex loci contractus set forth in Restatement of the law of
the Conflicts of Law§ 332 and which makes the law of the place where
the contract is signed determine the validity, meaning and effect of an
agreement.). Fallowed in Yahoo Inc v. La Llgue Cantre Lw Radseme
Et L'Anlfsenltlseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (91h Cir. 2006) (... in contract cases,
we typically inquire into whether a defendant ... "consummate[s] [a]
transaction" in the forum, focusing on activities such as delivering goods
to or executing a contract in the forum state. See Schwarzenegger,
37 4 F .3d at 802. ); Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179,
03-4189 (10th Cir. 2005) (Exercising personal jurisdiction where a
contract that was presented through the internet by a French defendant
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was signed in Utah and committed Plaintiff to obligations in Utah in
perfomance on the contract.).
(2)

A contract is consummated where it is reduced to writing and signed.
Rayv. Frasure, 200 P.3d 1174, 146 Idaho 625 OD 2009) (a contract
is consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); See Tolvo

Pottala Logging v. Boise Cascade 733 P.2d 71 O; 112 Idaho 489 Odaho
1987) (if plaintiff wished to consummate the contract to purchase, he
usually must sign the standard form prepared by the manufacturer and
tender consideration.); Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for
"executed contracf', are: a written and signed contract, or a contract
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009).
(3)

Contract formation occurs when consideration is tendered to form the
contract. Mltcheii v. Slqueros, 582 P.2d i074; 99 Idaho 396 Qdaho
1978) (Contract formation occurs when consideration is given to form the
contract.); l.C. § 28-2-204, dealing with formation in general provides
that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner ...
including conduct by a party which recognizes the existence of such
a contract."); Hudson v. Cobbs, 797 P.2d 1322; 118 Idaho 474 (ID
1990) (The contracts were formed when Hudson signed them, relying
on the representations of Cobbs and Kennevick that the leases were
valid contracts under which they intended to be obligated. ).

(4)

Unilateral contracts are consumatted where the offeree accepts the terms
of the uniiaterai offer and performs thereunder to secure the promises
in the offer. See Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus

Lines Insurance Company; Case No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03l2011) ,
the 91h circuit re - affirmed the factual circumstances under which a
unilateral contract will be formed, executed and subject to enforcement.
The Ninth circuit cited to Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for
"executed contract", to wit: a written and signed contract, or a contract
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009). Accordingly, "A unilateral
contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for
the other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes
acceptance and execution of the contract." Here, the fax from Bellevue
Master to Northwest on February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would
be able to continue working as a subcontractor at the construction project
provided it complied with Bellevue Master's insurance requirements. When
Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested that the broker
issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest accepted the
unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will
be formed and executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of the
offer in Shore v. Peterson, 204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009)
("where the offeror makes a promise that is conditional on the offeree"s
acceptance, an offeree accepts by rendition of the requested performance.")
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citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 at 52 (1963) (An offer for a
unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of the requested
performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107
Idaho 286, 291, 688 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 1984).
(5)

Loan obligations created in the forum state to fund contracts creates
contacts in the forum state where the payments on the loans are expected
to generate. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d@ 640,
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.) ("Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit a
loan is a purposeful contact with Texas under a contracts anaylsis.) See
also Pro Axess inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189
(10th Cir. 2005 ) ( Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract that
was presented through the internet by a French defendant was signed
in Utah and committed Plaintiff to monetary obligations in Utah in
perfomance on the contract.); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V.,
218 P.3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 Qdaho 2009) (loans obtained locally for
business purposes result in contact with forum.) same Hsu v. Liu, Case no.
07-1046 (Texas Supreme Court 2007)

(6)

Phone calls, faxes, letters, and emails sent in the forum state to firm up
contract negotiations or correct contract errors, are contacts with the forum.
Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (''The acts of making
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing alone, may be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant where the phone
c.a!!s and faxes resulted in a consummated contract where consideration
generated from the forum state.); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d
938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that phone calls and faxes into the forum
created jurisdiction in suit based on those calls and faxes); Taylor v. Phelan,
912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it creates a substantial
connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can support
jurisdiction."); FMC Corp. v.Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1990)
(sending allegedly false faxes to forum state created specific jurisdiction in
lawsuit based on those faxes); Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328, 332333 (5th Cir. 1982) (single telephone call initiated by the defendant was
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction).
None of the foregoing transactions occurred in the state of Texas and the

record is devoid of any evidence competently showing otherwise.
Supreme Court in Ray

Affirming the Idaho

v. Frasure, 200 P.3d 1174, 146 Idaho 625

OD

contract is consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); and

Siqueros, 582

2009) (a

Mitchell v.

P.2d 1074; 99 Idaho 396 Odaho 1978) (Contract formation occurs

when consideration is given to form the contract.), there can be no doubt that the contract
at issue here was formed in Idaho. Moreover Plaintiff performed on the unilateral contract
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in the state of Idaho and obligated herself to numerous debts to fund the transaction.
Accordingly on contracts grounds,

Idaho had the greatest interest in trying Plaintiffs

contract claims and specific personal jurisdiction existed over the defendants .

Issue No. 4
Whether equity claims of specific performance and constructive trust may be
heard in Idaho courts when pertaining to real estate located outside the state of Idaho when the fraud or deception practiced by the tortfeasor specifically caused to the
equitable claims to arise to the iniury of an Idaho resident. here TELFORD.
In the instant case, Judge Dunn ruled that TELFORD could not meet the
tortious injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute because the transaction involved the
purchase of real property in the State of Texas which could not be physically delivered to
Telford in Idaho. C.R. 420, para. 1 :
If the real property [sic but) had been portable and Telford had "
taken possession of the property in Idaho, like the purchaser in
Blimka, then the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute may
have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the
Defendants. However, real property is not portable. Under
these circumstances the injury could only be felt in Texas.
TELFORD contends that the court errored in self fashioning the demands of
Plaintiffs Complaint. Nowhere in the underlying litgation did TELFORD ask that the real
property be delivered to her. On the contrary,

all pleadings on file with the trial court

made equitable demands of specific performance and constructive trust. C.R. 394 , C.R.
395 footnote 4.
The seminole case supporting TELFORD's contention that the trial court should
have ordered SMITH county to TURN OVER THE DEED TO TELFORD is
Morrow, 680 P.2d 1355; 106 Idaho 455 (Idaho 1984).

Andre v.

10

10.

A brief analysis of that case is as follows:
Plaintiff-Respondent (Andre) brought an action in California against
defendantsappellants (Morrows), Idaho residents, to impose a constructive trust on
certain real property located in Idaho, in which the Morrows held legal title and which
Andre asserted they had allegedly acquired through fraud committed upon Andre's

conservtee. The California Court ruled in favor of Andre and ordered the Morrows to
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As set forth in Morrow, a California court determined that Morrow, an Idaho
resident, had committed fraud against a California resident and obtained title to Idaho
property owne byt the California resident.

A conxtructive trust was ordered

and

Marrowed was directed to convey title back to the California resident.
The same results should have obtained in the instant action.

There is no

question that fraud and deciet were practiced upon TELFORD within the meaning of
Idaho's consumer Protection Act

and the

Idaho RICO Act.

The Idaho consumer

Protection Act provides for equitable relief as an additional remedy and also provides for
automatic personal jurisdiction over Defendants alleged to have engaged in unfair
practices. Therefore, the court could have granted TELFORD numerous requests to turn

convey the title to Andre. Andre filed a copy of the California judgment with the Clerk of
the District Court for Nez Perce County, Idaho, and sought full faith and credit on the
judgment. The Morrows attacked the California judgment asserting that it was not entitled
to recognition because the California court lacked jurisdiction to directly affect title to
property located in Idaho. This contention is error.
It is well settled that upon a finding of personal jurisdiction, a court of a
foreign state can issue a personal judgment ordering a conveyance of real property
by a party before that court and that this is a valid exercise of a court's power.
Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Idaho Gold Mining Co. v. Winchell, 6
Idaho 729,59 P. 533 (1899); Millerv. Miller, 109 Misc.2d 982, 441 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1981 );
Blue River Sawmills, Ltd. v. Gates, 225 Or. 439,358 P.2d 239 (1960); Silver Surprize, Inc.
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wash.2d 519, 445 P.2d 334 (1968); 50 C.J.S. Judgments §
889 h. (1947), Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees
for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34 Yale L.J. 591 (1925); 50 C.J.S. Judgments§ 889
h. (1947). Courts are authorized to issue equity decrees which order an in
personam conveyance of land located in another state. Varone v. varone, 359 F.2d
769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183
Conn. 490, 439 A.2d 425 (1981 ); Weesner.v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682
(1959); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws
§ 102 comment d (1971 ).
Here, the California court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the
Morrows under the tortious injury prong of California's long arm statute through the fraud
committed by the Morrows upon the conservetee, a California resident. We affirm the trial
court's judgment directing the Morrows to convey title in the real property to Andre. Furthermore
the Morrows are to pay attorneys fees and costs.
The California Court had authority to order a constructive trust over the property
assets and title '#here legal title to property has been obtained through actual fraud,
misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities,
or under
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain beneficial

interest in the property. Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 167 P.481 (1917).
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over title or pay TELFORD the market value of the improved property.
The trial Court did neither to the substantial prejudice of TELFORD.

Issue No. 5
Whether l.C. 19-302 may be used as a jurisdictional statute to invoke personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who commit in whole or in part any element of a
racketeering predicate act within the state of Idaho.

l.C. § 19-302 has been interpreted to mean that personal jurisdiction will exist
if the conduct performed outside the state caused a criminal result or effect within the

state.

Personal Jurisdiction under criminal law is the loci whern one element of a

crime is completed.

See Idaho v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316; 121 Idaho 911 (10, 1992)

(Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general rule that "the requisite elements of
the completed crime may be committed in different jurisdictions, and in such cases any
state in which an element of the crime is committed may take jurisdiction.n[Footnote 4121
Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 345 at 598 (1981 ); accord Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818
S.W> 2d 242 (1991); State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464,771 P.2d 1150 (1989); -tate v.
Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144A49 N.W.2d 762 (1989); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. Z69, 645 P.2d
784 (1982).
Furthermore, the civil racketeering act has the same rules imposed upon it as are
imposed in the criminal forum, except the standard of proof is lower under the civil form.
See 18-7803.

Definitions. As used in this chapter, (a) "Racketeering" means any act

which is chargeable or indictable under the following sections ofthe Idaho Code or which
are equivalent acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws of any
other jurisdiction.
One such case where the criminal statute was applied in a civil contempt case to
acquire personal jurisdiction over Doyle was in Idaho v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316; 121 Idaho
911 (ID, 1992) The facts and legal conclusion of that case were as follows:
On August 19, 1988, a complaint against Doyle was filed with the
Ada County District Court for the crime of child custody interference and a
warrant was issued for his arrest. Doyle was returned to Idaho for
prosecution. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Doyle
argued that because neither he nor Cindy nor Shawn were in Idaho when
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any act of withholding may have occurred, such act must have occurred in
either the State of Oregon or the State of Washington. Therefore, under l.C. §
19-301, the State of Idaho was allegedly without jurisdiction to prosecute the
action. The trial court denied Doyle's motion to dismiss, finding that the
state did have jurisdiction under l.C. § 19·302 because the crime was
consummated within Idaho.
We first note our standard of review. Subject matter jurisdiction
presents a question of law over which we exercise free review. Hanson v.
State, 121 Idaho 507,826 P.2d 468 (1992): Gage v. Harris, 119 Idaho
451,807 P.2d 1289 (Ct.App.1991 ). Reflecting this approach, l.C. §, 18-202
sets forth Idaho's territorial jurisdiction as follows: Territorial jurisdiction
over accused persons liable to punishment. --The following persons are
to
punishment
under
the
laws
of
this
state:
liable
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within
this state. This Court has stated that it must be inferred from the language
of Subsection 1. of the above statute that "the legislature intended to
punish any person who should commit any portion of a crime within this
state to the same extent and in the same manner as though all of the acts
which constitute the crime had been committed here." State v. Sheehan,
33 Idaho 553, 561-62, 196 P. 532, 534 (1921 ). States with statutes similar
to l.C. § 19-302 have interpreted them to mean. that jurisdiction will
exist if the conduct performed outside the state caused a criminal
result or effect within the state. [Footnote 3] See Wheat v. State, 734
P.2d 1007, 1010 (Alaska Ct.App.1987) ("crime committed when results in
injury in the state.");
Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general nile that nthe
requisite elements of the completed crime may be committed in different
jurisdictions, and in such cases any state in which an essential part of the
crime is committed may take jurisdiction."[Footnote 4] 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal
Law § 345 at 598 (1981): accord Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 S.W.2d
242 (1-991); State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989); State v.
Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144,449 N.W.2d 762 (1989); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz.
269,645 P.2d 784 (1982). This general rule is also acknowledged in the Model
Penal Code which states that a person can be prosecuted if either the
conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is an element
of the injury occurs within the State." Model Penal Code§ 1.03(1)(a).
Given this statutory structure, an Idaho court will have subject matter
jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, even a result,
occurs within Idaho.

Under federal law 18 USC section 7803,

the civil racketeering act has the

same rules imposed upon it as are imposed in the criminal forum, except the standard of
poot is lower under the civil form. As such, Plaintiff contends that the criminal rule for
imposing personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant eqaully applies to Idaho's
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racketeering act.
Plaintiff's complaint charged the Defendants with the following criminal acts:

(1)

l.C. 18-2403. Theft.
A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to
deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself
or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such
property from an owner thereof.
(d)
By false promise:
1. A person obtains property by false promise when pursuant
to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by
means of a representation, express or implied. that he or a
third person will in the future engage in particular conduct,
and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or,
as the case may be, does not believe that the third person
intends to engage in such conduct
(e) By extortion :
A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to
a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the
property is not so delivered, the actor or another will:
4.
Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to
be instituted against him; or
7.
Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information
with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
8.
Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some
act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing
to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some
person adversely; or
9.
Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit
the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially
with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career,
financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

The record shows that plaintiff complained of the foregoing conduct from the
outset of the case.

First,

Plaintiff alleged theft by false promises over a coarse of 4

months until the defendants successfully stole more than $250,000 in residential portable
and non portable properties from Plaintiff.
Next Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants committed theft by extortion by
engaging in the foregoing conduct that met the elements of this crime; all within the state
of Idaho and by illicit abuse of Idaho public offices.
Accordingly,

there is no question that jurisdiction exists in the Idaho on
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Plaintiffs RICO claims contrary to the court's summary conclusion.

Issue No. 6:
Whether the specially appearing defendants actually made a general_
appearance in the underlying action because they failed to limit their initial motion to an
attack on personal jurisdiction only.

The record shows that the defendants made a general appearance by arguing
the merits of plaintiffs substantive claims in tandem with arguing personal jurisdiction
issues.

C.R. 67-89.

Plaintiff contends that the defendants should have stayed out of

court on all of their merits argument until they sustained a ruiing on personal jurisdiction
only under rule 4(i). Accordingly,

plaintiff contends that the defendants made a general

appearance and waived the issue of personal jurisdiction.

Issue No. 7
Whether the trial court errored as a matter of law when he entered a final
judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims against the specially appearing defendants with
prejudice on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction. in violation of IRCP rule 41 (b).
IRCP Rule 41 (b) provides in part:
... Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a

dismissal for lack of jurisdictionJ or for failure to join
a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.
In Scott v. Agricultural Products, 627 P.2d 326; 102 Idaho 147 (ID 1981) : The
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that a Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction should be without
prejudice under rule 41 (b). The Court held that because the district court did not qualify
his dismissal order, we so modify the order to be without prejudice as a dismissal under
Rule 41 (b), otherwise the dismissal with prejudice will bar a subsequent action involving
the same claim between the parties or their privies. Costello v. United States, 365 U.DS.
265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). See also Bauscher Grain v. Nat'I Sur. Corp., 92
Idaho 229, 440 P.2d 349 (1968); National Ro-Tile Corp. v. Loomis, 82 Idaho, 65, 350 P.2d
217 (1960).
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The record herein shows that on February 29, 2012, Judge Dunn entered a final
judgment in this action dismissing plaintiffs claims against the specially appearing
defendants with prejudice as C.R. 423-425.

The entire trial record shows that the Court

refused to reach any other issue or claim other than the issue of personal jurisdiction.
As provided by Rule 41 (b), and Scott supra, the Court was without authority to dismiss
plantiffs claims agianst the specially appearing defendants with prejudice and should
have dismissed these claims without prejudice. TELFORD asks this court to reverse the
trial court's ruling.

Issue No. 8
Whether the trial court errored in not allowing TELFORD to amend her
complaint in accordance with the evidence presented before the conclusion of the case.
It is uncontested that the proceedings before the trial court were summary
judgment proceedings and therefore not based soely on the initial pleading in the action.
Several times during the coarse of the proceedings, TELFORD asked for permission to
amend the complaint to add in new and additional allegations.

Judge Dunn decline

TELFORD's request because final judgment had been entered. C.R. 451.
However the rules of civil procedure rule 15(b) and Thomas v. Arkoosh
Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (Idaho 2002) hold:

l.R.C.P. 15(b) provides:

Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be

made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
Furthermore, Thomas supra decisioned that claims not raised in the pleadings
may be argued in motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Same in Consolidated
AG of Curry, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 128 Idaho 228,912 P.2d115 (Idaho 1996) (The trial court
properly concluded that the issues that would allow plaintiff to recover against IFA directly
were tried by 'implied consent' of IFA.)
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plaintiff was entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of law,

even after final judgment.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons,

plaintiff requests that this court direct a

wholesale reversal of the judgments of the trial court and hold that personal jurisdiction
existed over all defendants in the underlying case;
against every non-appearing defendant;

enter defaults and default judgments
remand plaintiffs case against the

Appellees/Defendants appearing in this appeal for trial on the merits, and direct the trial
court to permit plaintiff to amend her chief complaint to conform to the evidence.

/SI
Holli Telford
Pro Se
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